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ABSTRACT 
For over a decade, the Mexican government has invested itself 
in a “frontal attack” on drug trafficking organizations with 
catastrophic results.  Little to nothing has been gained in limiting 
drug production, use, or trafficking, while violence has skyrocketed 
and major institutional and human rights crises have evolved.  
Through a multidisciplinary approach—which includes history, 
sociology, policy analysis, and constitutional doctrine—this essay 
evaluates drug prohibition in Mexico: its history, key components 
and documented results.  It concludes that prohibition, as a guiding 
principle of drug policy, can and should be abandoned for all drugs, 
for both practical and normative reasons.  It proposes a set of 
guiding principles that should orient the legalization of all drugs 
and then fleshes out concrete regulatory proposals for specific drug 
markets, pondering their relative benefits and risks.  Although 
anchored in a specific case study, the essay should be considered a 
broader contribution to enrich discussions as drug policy reform 
moves from state to national jurisdictions and from marijuana to 
other drugs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
We start by fully agreeing with a chief conclusion of the 2011 
Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy: “The global war 
on drugs has failed, with devastating consequences for individuals 
and societies around the world.”1  We adhere to the Commission’s 
observation that the international drug control regime, by being 
based essentially on a punitive law enforcement paradigm, has 
resulted in more violence, larger prison populations, and the erosion 
of governance around the world.2  Additionally, the health concerns 
associated with drug use have been negatively affected by the drug 
control regime’s efforts.3 
Globally, prohibition has proven to be a poor framework for the 
protection of health, risk management and harm reduction.  
Moreover, when strongly enforced, prohibition has devastating 
effects on institutional capacity and legitimacy, economic 
development, social peace, and public health, as measured in terms 
of the most basic indicators.4  The prevailing drug policy, including 
reduction of drug use, availability of illicit drugs or the efficiency of 
institutional resources, has been ineffective and, in fact, 
counterproductive.  As stated in the 2014 Global Commission on 
Drug Policy’s Report: “After more than half a century of this 
punitive approach, there is now overwhelming evidence that 
[prohibition] has not only failed to achieve its own objectives but has 
also generated serious social and health problems.”5 
 
 1 Global Commission on Drug Policy, The War on Drugs 2 (June 2011), 
https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/GCDP_WaronDrugs_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87HL-5GAC]. 
 2 Id. at 2–3. 
 3 See id. at 2 (“[r]epressive efforts directed at consumers impede public health 
measures to reduce HIV/AIDS, overdose fatalities, and other harmful 
consequences of drug use.”). 
 4 See OLIVER MEZA & EDGAR GUERRA, POLÍTICA DE DROGAS EN LAS AMÉRICAS: 
REDEFINIENDO EL PROBLEMA Y EL PAPEL DEL ESTADO [DRUG POLICY IN THE AMERICAS: 
REDEFINING THE PROBLEM AND THE ROLE OF THE STATE] 1, 26 (2017), 
http://www.politicadedrogas.org/PPD/documentos/20171204_124423_pol%C3
%ADtica_de_drogas_en_las_américas_v0.10_isbn.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPY3-
MVAG] (affirming that the current state drug enforcement scheme harms its 
citizens by reducing public health, delegitimizing the state, and creating avoidable 
social and economic costs). 
 5 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies 
That Work 11 (Sept. 2014), https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
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The irony is that this failure, happening in Mexico and globally, 
should not be surprising at all, considering that the policy is wholly 
inconsistent with best knowledge from life sciences, sound public 
health research, and basic economic analysis.  Essential insights 
from life sciences indicate that even if the best possible prevention 
strategies were applied—which unfortunately has never been the 
case—there would still be a residual demand for drugs, irrespective 
of whether they are prohibited or even highly priced in whichever 
market they are available.  For its part, economic analysis 
demonstrates that prohibiting the production and consumption of 
any merchandise for which demand exists invariably leads to the 
creation of a black market by individuals and organizations willing 
to violate the law.6  Significantly, it also indicates that 
decriminalizing the use and production of a prohibited drug and 
taxing its consumption would cause a greater reduction in its output 
than the enforcement of its prohibition (even if enforcement were 
aimed at an optimal level, in practice, most likely unachievable).7 
Drugs have been a part of human culture throughout history.  
Prohibition has been the exception, not the rule, in deciding what to 
do about drugs.  Prohibition is an experiment that has failed 
brutally.8  Mexico is one of the most dramatic examples of this failure 
and its costly consequences.  It is both a transit country and a 
producer of illicit substances destined primarily for the United 
States.  The size of Mexico’s illegal drug activities makes it a fertile 
ground for criminal organizations to profit and obtain abundant 
resources that can be used to corrupt authorities and institutions.  
Despite harsh drug laws and intensive enforcement of these laws, 
the use of drugs in Mexico has increased over the past decade.  
Additionally, legal institutions and constitutional protections have 
 
content/uploads/2016/03/GCDP_2014_taking-control_EN.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7RL-K8AD]. 
 6 See, e.g., Ernesto Zedillo, Drug Policy: A Shameful Failure of Modern Civilization, 
in ENDING THE WAR ON DRUGS, 23–38 (Richard Branson ed., 2016) (observing the 
connections between drug prohibition policies and the rise of black markets and 
violent crime in the Americas). 
 7 See Gary S. Becker, Kevin Murphy, & Michael Grossman, The Economic 
Theory of Illegal Goods: The Case on Drugs 18–19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10976, 2004), https://www.nber.org/papers/w10976.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/54EK-36T7]. 
 8 See, e.g., Oriol Romaní, Una antropología de las drogas [An anthropology of 
drugs], LA JORNADA (July 2, 2015), https://www.jornada.com.mx/2015/07/02/ls-
opinion.html [https://perma.cc/83KY-NTZP] (noting that the main flaw in the 
experiment of prohibition is that it assumed the ability to solve complex social 
problems with scientific or bureaucratic management). 
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been weakened, scarce resources have been misspent and violence 
has been fueled.  And yet, Mexico’s drug laws—premised on 
prohibition—have remained practically unchanged.  More 
strikingly, their enforcement has been increasingly enhanced.  
Today, Mexico criminally persecutes and incarcerates people who 
use drugs, women with no prior convictions who transport drugs 
from one place to another, and small-scale drug dealers (who are 
easily replaced by other young men or women when detained).9  
Mexico also uses military forces to intercept drug trafficking and to 
eradicate illicit crops, using dangerous pesticides that pollute the 
water and contaminate the land in poor rural areas.10 
The policy conclusions stemming from the above insights, for 
which the Global Commission has advocated and which we fully 
endorse, are very concrete: if drug policy puts public health, 
community safety, human rights and development at its center, the 
last thing that governments should be doing is inducing black 
markets where criminal organizations thrive.11  Consequently, 
States should stop criminalizing people for drug use and possession.  
It would be inconsistent to decriminalize demand without taking 
supply out of the hands of criminal organizations.  Other aspects 
being equal, demand liberalization could boost the illegal 
traffickers’ revenues and thus their criminal power.  Hence, the 
Commission’s other key recommendation is for States to get the 
supply of drugs under control through responsible legal 
regulation.12 
We subscribe to those recommendations mindful that for over a 
century, prohibition—and its intended enforcement—has prevailed 
as the preferred policy approach for dealing with the use of drugs, 
but also encouraged by changes that have been taking place lately.  
In 2013, Uruguay became the first country to pass a law fully 
regulating cannabis, which took effect in 2017.13  Canada followed 
 
 9 See Catalina Pérez Correa & Andrés Ruiz, A ras de tierra: Marihuana y 
Pesticidas [At ground level: Marijuana and Pesticides], NEXOS (July 2018), 
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=38377 [https://perma.cc/TTM3-EVVK]. 
 10 See id. at 9 (asserting that paraquat, the pesticide often used by the state to 
destroy marijuana crops, often causes severe health problems such as intestinal 
bleeding, liver damage, skin problems, and an increased risk of Parkinson’s when 
ingested due to water and crop contamination). 
 11 Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, supra note 5. 
 12 Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies That Work, supra note 5, at 23–31. 
 13 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of 
Drugs 10 (2018), https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
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in 2017.14  By November 2018, 28 states within the United States had 
regulated cannabis for medical purposes and eight of those had 
regulated cannabis for recreational purposes.15  In January 2018, 
Vermont became the first state to legalize cannabis for adult use 
through the legislative process.16  Several Latin-American countries 
have also regulated cannabis for medical purposes.17  Of course, 
earlier successful experiences with policies giving more importance 
to public health than to punitive actions, like those in Portugal, 
Switzerland and Australia, are also supportive of the approaches 
suggested below for Mexico’s case.18 
The first part of this document briefly explains the origins of 
Mexican prohibition early in the 20th century and describes some of 
the existing drug policies and laws.  The second part reviews some 
of the most salient negative consequences of current policies, both 
for people who use drugs and for the broader population in terms 
of public health and public security.  It shows that prohibition, 
undoubtedly, has had serious costs on the institutional capacity to 
prevent and punish criminality.  The third section proposes basic 
principles that should orient drug policy in Mexico and 
recommendations for its reform.  Finally, based on those principles, 
we offer concrete proposals for the decriminalization and regulation 
of drug markets in the country. 
As the Global Commission on Drug Policy affirms in its 2018 
report, Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, there is no “one 
size fits all” regulation model.19  Rather, “regulation models adopted 
 
content/uploads/2018/09/ENG-2018_Regulation_Report_WEB-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E47F-YNCK]. 
 14 Id. at 14, 31. 
 15 Marijuana Overview, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 
2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/marijuana-
overview.aspx [https://perma.cc/TX4C-UWCG]. 
 16 Id. 
 17 See, e.g., Juan Diego Bogotá, Marihuana Medicinal: ¿cuáles Países Lideran En 
América Latina? [Medical marijuana: which countries lead in Latin American?] LATIN 
AMERICAN POST (June 26, 2019), https://latinamericanpost.com/28658-medical-
marijuana-which-countries-lead-in-latin-america [https://perma.cc/54B9-A92Q] 
(noting that Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay have approved the 
medical use of marijuana). 
 18 GLENN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR 
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES, (CATO Institute, 2009), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/greenwald_whitepaper.p
pd [https://perma.cc/VNU3-LY8J]. 
 19 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of 
Drugs, supra note 13, at 11. 
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in different places will need to be shaped by, and sensitive to, local 
economic political, and cultural environments.”20  The approaches 
sketched here draw from international experiences but aim 
specifically to fit the Mexican context.  Whenever convenient, rather 
than advocate for a particular model, we present a spectrum of 
regulatory options that could be considered in the Mexican context. 
Mexico’s current security crisis is profound and complex.  
Corruption and impunity are common in many public institutions, 
notably in those in charge of providing justice and security.  The 
2017 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Mexico 135 out of 180 
countries with a score of 29 (out of 100).21  The country’s ranking has 
worsened since 2012.22  Additionally, a recent report measuring the 
quality of criminal justice institutions at the state level showed that 
the probability of a crime being investigated in Mexico is .90 
percent.23  Even violent crimes, like homicides, have extremely high 
impunity levels.  In the State of Guerrero for example, during 2016 
the probability of a homicide being criminally punished was less 
than 4 percent.24  Another report shows the difficult conditions in 
which police operate throughout the country, with poor wages and 
no labor stability, despite the risks involved in their work.25 
Drug policy reform is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
address this crisis.  It will not, on its own, solve the problem of weak 
 
 20 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Regulation: The Responsible Control of 
Drugs, supra note 13, at 12–13. 
 21 The Corruption Perceptions Index undertaken by Transparency 
International ranks 180 countries and territories by their perceived levels of public 
sector corruption according to experts and businesspeople, it uses a scale of 0 to 
100, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is very clean.  Mexico’s score of 29 has gotten 
worse in the last five years.  It had a score of 34 in 2012, dropping to 31 and 30 in 
2015 and 2016 respectively.  See Corruption Perceptions Index 2017, TRANSPARENCY 
INTERNATIONAL, (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_20
17#table [https://perma.cc/46Y7-RSVB]. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See GUILLERMO RAÚL ZEPEDA LECUONA, ÍNDICE ESTATAL DE DESEMPEÑO DE LAS 
PROCURADURÍAS Y FISCALÍAS [STATE INDEX LEVEL OF PERFORMANCE OF THE ATTORNEY 
AND PROSECUTION OFFICES] 26–27 (2017), 
https://www.impunidadcero.org/uploads/app/articulo/49/archivo/152657558
3R54.pdf  [https://perma.cc/G4DQ-9BYU]. 
 24 Id. at 29. 
 25 See Causa en Común, ¿Qué piensa la policía? [What do the police think?]  5, 
17 (2017), http://causaencomun.org.mx/beta/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/Presentaci%C3%B3n_encuesta.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7HDS-FFUC] (aggregating police responses to various survey 
questions about job security, wages, and other related topics). 
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rule of law, lack of justice, or insecurity problems that Mexico has 
suffered for too long.  The often-precarious state of legal institutions 
is a problem that, in our view, constitutes the chief obstacle for 
achieving the country’s full economic, social and political 
development.  To tackle effectively that immense problem, a 
comprehensive, ambitious, well-thought, and properly funded 
reform of the pertinent institutions is indispensable.  However, a 
radical change in drug policy is a fundamental part of rule of law 
reform.  Through the criminalization of drug-related activities the 
State spends scarce human, economic and institutional resources 
that should be placed elsewhere.  Drug policy today is also the 
justification for the prosecution and incarceration of thousands of 
young men and women, the impoverishment of farmers and 
communities and the use of violence by the State.  As stated by the 
Global Commission on Drug Policy: 
A new and improved global drug control regime is needed that 
better protects the health and safety of individuals and communities 
around the world.  Harsh measures grounded in repressive 
ideologies must be replaced by more humane and effective policies 
shaped by scientific evidence, public health principles and human 
rights standards.  This is the only way to simultaneously reduce 
drug-related death, disease and suffering and the violence, crime, 
corruption and illicit markets associated with ineffective 
prohibitionist policies.26 
2. PROHIBITION 
History of prohibition in Mexico 
Prohibition is often justified as a means to protect public health. 
A brief historic contextualization of prohibition in Mexico, however, 
shows that the origins of its normative justification lie, not in the 
protection of public health, but in prejudices and discrimination. 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the use of 
drugs such as marijuana, cocaine, and opium was not uncommon in 
Mexico.  Products derived from these substances were available in 
pharmacies and public markets.  The first attempts to regulate these 
 
 26 Global Commission on Drug Policy, Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies 
That Work, supra note 5, at 6. 
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substances in the late nineteenth century sought to protect 
consumers by controlling quality.27 
In the 1920s, the discourse surrounding drugs changed 
dramatically as the government sought to regulate both the use and 
trafficking of narcotics to address public health-related issues and 
contain nascent drug trafficking networks.  In 1923, drug trade was 
prohibited for the first time.28  Mexico’s post-revolutionary 
government was keen on international recognition, particularly 
from the United States, which was advocating prohibition beyond 
its borders.29  There was no evidence of serious health problems 
related to drug use at the time, yet public health protection was 
presented as the primary reason to adopt prohibition.30  Absurdly, 
another core argument used then to support the adoption of 
prohibition was the purported association of drugs with the 
“degeneration of the race”.31 
The Federal Criminal Code of 1931 first introduced a blanket 
prohibition for certain substances in a chapter labeled “Crimes 
Against Health”.  Trade, production, possession, purchase, sale, 
supply, traffic, and cultivation of specific substances and plants 
were defined as crimes.32  What existed prior to this blanket 
prohibition of substances was a series of specific bans on 
adulteration and trade.  Again, prohibition was justified under the 
grotesque argument that drug use was “a vice that poisons and 
 
 27 Luis Astorga, Drug Trafficking in Mexico: A First General Assessment, (Mgmt. 
of Soc. Transformations (MOST) & UNESCO, Discussion Paper No. 36, 1999), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001176/117644eo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7HDS-FFUC]. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 ”Racial degeneration” is never explicitly defined in any congressional 
proceedings.  The concept, however, is analyzed in Campos, where the idea is 
understood to be central in justifying prohibition in Mexico.  According to him, 
“degeneration” had, since the late nineteenth century, been used as a scientific 
concept used in the West to refer to “an empirically demonstrable biological, 
medical or physically fact” and not just a philosophical problem.  In Mexico, it had 
been used to establish a separation between pre-independence period and 
modernity.  Implicitly, saying that drugs would cause “degeneration of the race” 
meant that people who use drugs would return to pre-colonial—i.e. indigenous—
ways of life, away from the new Europeanized life of the cities.  See Isaac Campos, 
Degeneration and the Origins of Mexico’s War on Drugs, 26 MEXICAN STUD. 379 (2010). 
 32  See Fernanda Alonso, La historia de la política mexicana de drogas en el siglo XX 
[The history of Mexican drug policy in XX century], in DROGAS, POLÍTICA Y SOCIEDAD EN 
AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE [DRUGS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE CARRIBEAN] (Beatriz Labate & Thiago Rodrigues eds., 2015). 
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deteriorates the individual and more generally, the species”.33  No 
scientific or empirical evidence was given at the time to support 
either that claim or the claim that there was a relevant drug-related 
health problem in Mexico. 
During the Lázaro Cárdenas Administration (1934-1940), the 
Department of Public Health adopted a policy that briefly broke 
away from prohibition.  Stating that people who use drugs should 
not be criminalized but treated as patients, the Cárdenas 
Administration published a federal “Drug Addiction Decree,” 
which launched a program for state-controlled drug distribution 
and medical use.  Under the Decree, users could be prescribed drugs 
that were banned by the Sanitary Code, including heroin, morphine, 
cocaine and cannabis.  Both registered doctors and government-
controlled dispensaries could prescribe these substances in a 
controlled manner and at a price lower than in that of the black 
market. 34  The Decree also provided funding for sustaining hospitals 
and dispensaries that lacked sufficient resources for users who 
needed treatment or care. 
The policy, although short-lived, was seemingly successful; it 
drew an important number of users, especially in Mexico City, away 
from the black market and into the safer, state-sponsored 
distribution system.35  In 1939, Mexico defended this policy at the 
XXIC Session of the Advisory Commission on Traffic in 
Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, in Geneva.  Government officials 
argued that the new regulation was backed by scientific studies 
which had been carried out by experts, both from the medical and 
legal perspective.  The United States, however, criticized the 
proposal to further it, arguing that it would result in the 
uncontrollable increase of illicit traffic and smuggling of drugs to the 
United States.  The United States government further pressured the 
 
 33 Código Penal Federal [CPF], Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en 
materia de fuero común y para toda la República en materia de fuero federal 
[Federal District and Federal Territorites in matters of common jurisdiction and for 
the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], art. 194, 1931 (Mex.), 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpf/CPF_orig_14ago31_ima.pd
f [https://perma.cc/Z5LV-76NY]. 
 34 Reglamento Federal de Toxicomanías [Federal Regulation of Drug 
Addictions], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 17-02-1940 (Mex.), 
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4510267&fecha=17/02/1940
&cod_diario=191983 [https://perma.cc/24MD-HUH6]. 
 35 See FROYLÁN ENCISO, NUESTRA HISTORIA NARCÓTICA: PASAJES PARA 
(RE)LEGALIZAR LAS DROGAS EN MÉXICO [OUR NARCOTICS HISTORY: PASSAGES TO 
(RE)LEGALIZING DRUGS IN MEXICO] (Debate 2015). 
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Cárdenas Administration by suspending pharmaceutical trade 
between the two countries.  Under pressure from both the United 
States government and lobbyists from the United States’ 
pharmaceutical companies, Mexico adopted a prohibitionist policy 
once again, backtracking from the innovative program just four 
months after it was launched.36 
In 1947, prohibition was made stricter: higher penalties were 
adopted, under the argument that Mexico had to act “for the due 
fulfillment of its international obligations” and that in order to show 
its commitment “with the joint action of all the governments of the 
civilized countries” it had to “repress the use of drugs”37 in reference 
to the Hague and Geneva Conventions of 1912, 1925, and 1933.  
Mexican legislators, however, recognized that in Mexico, “addiction 
had not been a serious problem in relation to policing, social or 
medical issues.”38  Other than compliance with international trends, 
the arguments for stricter penalties once again lacked evidence and 
deepened the discriminatory undertones that inspired the original 
ban.  As in the 1920’s, harsher laws were justified by using what 
 
 36 See ENCINAS, ALEJANDRO, DROGAS Y PODER EL FRACASO DE LA POLÍTICA 
PROHIBICIONISTA [DRUGS AND POWER THE FAILURE OF THE PROHIBITIONIST POLICY] 23–
25 (2d ed. 2016.) (recounting how the United States encouraged countries around 
the world to adopt prohibitionist drug policies in response to growing drug use 
domestically); ENCISO, supra note 35. 
 37 Exposición de motivos del proyecto de Decreto para que reforma y adiciona 
los artículos 193, 194 y 197 del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios 
Federales en materia de Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero 
Federal [Statement of reasons for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193, 
194 and 197 of the Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal Territories in 
matters of common jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal 
jurisdiction], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados [Journal of Debates 
of the Chamber of Deputies] 30-09-1947 (Mex.), 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/40/2do/Ord/19470930.html 
[https://perma.cc/3DSA-XH2F]. 
 38 See Dictamen del proyecto de Decreto que reforma y adiciona los artículos 
193, 194 y 197 del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y los Territorios Federales 
en materia de Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal 
[Opinion of the draft Decree that reforms and adds articles 193, 194 and 197 of the 
Penal Code for the Federal District and the Federal Territories in matters of common 
jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], Diario de 
los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados [Journal of Debates of the Chamber of 
Deputies] 07-10-1947 (Mex.), 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/40/2do/Ord/19471007.html 
[https://perma.cc/CHY6-WTDJ] (“Hasta entonces, en nuestro país, no había 
surgido como un mal grave ni policiaco, ni social, ni médico el problema de los 
toxicómanos.”) [“Until then, in our country, the problem of drug addicts had not 
arisen as serious, police-related, social, or medical evil.”]. 
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today would be considered ridiculous and unacceptable arguments 
such as the alleged impact drugs have on sexual preference: 
From the sexual point of view, the tendency of the species is 
the reproduction of the individuals, and it is in this aspect 
where, fundamentally, greater degradations are observed in 
the drug addicts.  It seems that morphinomania produces a 
setback in sexual maturity, at the initial stages of its 
development, such as ‘narcissism’ and homosexuality . . .  
And not only that, but drug addiction often discovers in the 
addicted individual homosexual tendencies that naturally 
prevent the development of the species.39 
Today, under the binding Constitutional text and interpretation, 
the arguments used for the establishment and enhancement of 
prohibition would not stand constitutional scrutiny and would 
certainly be deemed as a violation of the right to equality and the 
principle of non-discrimination.40  Fortunately, the racist and 
homophobic arguments that were deployed as the key support for 
prohibition during the first half of the century are no longer 
admissible.  Nevertheless, the “crimes against health” chapter of the 
Federal Criminal Code remains in force, albeit with no new 
arguments to support it. 
Prohibition in the post-Single Convention 1961 era 
Since 1947, the criminal thrust of the ban on drugs has remained 
fundamentally unaltered.  However, two tendencies dominated 
reforms to the legal regime throughout the second half of the 20th 
 
 39 Id. 
 40 The non-discrimination clause was included within the Mexican 
Constitution, in the reform of August 14, 2001, when a paragraph was added, to 
Article 1, where it was noted: “Queda prohibida toda discriminación motivada por 
origen étnico o nacional, el género, la edad, las discapacidades, la condición social, 
las condiciones de salud, la religión, las opiniones, las preferencias sexuales, el 
estado civil o cualquier otra que atente contra la dignidad humana y tenga por 
objeto anular o menoscabar los derechos y libertades de las personas.” [“Any 
discrimination motivated by ethnic or national origin, gender, age, disabilities, 
social condition, health conditions, religion, opinions, sexual preferences, civil 
status or any other that attempts against human dignity and aims to annul or 
undermine the rights and freedoms of individuals is prohibited.”]  See Constitución 
Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [CPEUM], art. 1, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DOF] 05-02-1917, últimas reformas DOF 27-01-2016 (Mex.), 
http://www.sct.gob.mx/JURE/doc/cpeum.pdf [https://perma.cc/2N9A-RLJR]. 
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century: an increase in sanctions for drug related conducts and the 
addition of new substances--such as MDMA and LSD--to the list of 
illegal substances.41  In 1967, penalties increased in deference to the 
recently entrenched international consensus on drug use: “due to its 
international projection, internal repercussion, extreme gravity and 
nature which is an assault on the physical and moral integrity of 
man.”42  In 1974, possession for personal use was decriminalized for 
people who “have a habit or need to consume” as long as the 
amount of possession was “strictly necessary” for personal use.43  
For “non-addicts” (a legal term) sanctions were lowered to a 
minimum of six months and maximum of three years prison 
sentence.44  However, for all other drug offenses, sanctions were 
increased, suggesting that “the tragic increase in the illegal use of 
narcotics and psychotropic drugs, mainly in the last decade” 
warranted a harsher response from the State.45  Again, no evidence 
was given to support this. 
 
 41 3, 4–Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as 
ecstasy (E) is a psychoactive drug primarily used as a recreational drug, whose 
effects include altered sensations and increased energy, empathy and pleasure.  
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), also known as acid, is a hallucinogenic drug, 
whose effects typically include altered thoughts, feelings, and awareness of one’s 
surroundings. 
 42 Exposición de motivos del proyecto de Decreto que reforma disposiciones 
del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en materia de 
Fuero Común y para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal [Statement of 
reasons for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193, 194 and 197 of the 
Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal Territories in matters of common 
jurisdiction and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction], Diario de 
los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 28 de noviembre de 1967 (Mex.), 
http://cronica.diputados.gob.mx/DDebates/47/1er/Ord/19671128.html 
[https://perma.cc/TJB8-F3V2]. 
 43 Código Penal Federal [CPF], art. 198, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 
31-12-1974 (Mex.), 
http://www.diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ref/cpf/CPF_ref34_31dic74_ima.pd
f [https://perma.cc/FG63-3WA9]. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Exposición de motivos del proyecto de reforma que incluye disposiciones 
del Código Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en Materia de 
Fuero Común y para toda la República en material de Fuero Federal, Código 
Federal de Procedimientos Penales y el Código Sanitario de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos, en Relación con Estupefacientes y Psicotrópicos [Statement of reasons 
for the draft Decree to reform and add articles 193, 194 and 197 of the Criminal Code 
for the Federal District and Federal Territories in matters of common jurisdiction 
and for the entire Republic in matters of federal jurisdiction, Federal Code of 
Criminal Procedures and the Sanitary Code of the United Mexican States, in relation 
to narcotic and psychotropic drugs], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de 
Diputados, 06-12-1974 (Mex.), 
http://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/wfProcesoLegislativoComplet
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In 1983, the Mexican Constitution was amended to include the 
right to health.  To justify this landmark step, the supermajority of 
Congress defined health as a broad concept that encompassed the 
provision of health care services, disease prevention, rehabilitation, 
technology and regulation of products for human consumption, 
including drugs (“food, beverages and medicines, narcotics and 
psychotropics”).46  The 1983 constitutional amendment should have 
been of great significance for drug policy, as it put health policy and 
health-oriented regulation at the forefront of state priorities.  Yet 
when drug crimes—catalogued as “crimes against health” in the 
Federal Criminal Code—were revised two years later, there was no 
significant revision of prohibition, but instead the adoption of 
harsher punishments.  In 1985, sanctions were again increased, 
stating that drug trafficking should be “considered a crime against 
humanity which transcends borders and satisfies petty and selfish 
interests, endangering the physical and moral health of all the 
inhabitants of the planet; which is why, as far as Mexico is 
concerned, we must promote programs aimed at eradicating these 
evils, in all their aspects.”47 
 
w.aspx?q=BHGCbWrG7ukiUiW/WEuu/r7I8GQqjgVu6ZuRSZ5azXHCZOKkdc9
PP9Y+ETNlPCoonBT5TPMyfoyhK+OoV+r+og== [https://perma.cc/AFC7-
8X9W]. 
 46 Alejandro Madrazo & Fernanda Alonso, El derecho a la salud en el sistema 
constitucional mexicano [The Right To Health in the Mexican Constitutional System] 
(Legal Studies Department (DEJ) CIDE, Working Paper No. 62, 2013), 
http://www.libreriacide.com/librospdf/DTEJ-62.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BWM-
RYV6].  During parliamentary debates leading to the constitutional amendment, 
the concept of health was discussed.  When exploring the “rich and vast” health 
legislation that had been produced at the time, the constitutional initiative refers 
matters such as “the prevention of disabilities; the rehabilitation of people with 
disabilities, the supplying of organs, tissues and corpses; food, beverage and 
medicine control; narcotics and psychotropic drugs control; protection of the health 
of children and the elderly; improvement and care of the environment.”  Later on, 
the initiative also mentions “drug quality control systems” and “preventive 
medicine and education for health” and links these with “mass communication.” 
 47 Dictamen del proyecto de Decreto que reforma disposiciones del Código 
Penal para el Distrito Federal y Territorios Federales en Materia de Fuero Común y 
para toda la República en materia de Fuero Federal [Dictation of the draft Decree 
that reforms provisions of the Criminal Code for the Federal District and Federal 
Territories in matters of common jurisdiction and for the enitre Republic in matters 
of federal jurisdiction], Diario de los Debates de la Cámara de Diputados, 09-12-
1985 (Mex.), 
http://legislacion.scjn.gob.mx/Buscador/Paginas/wfProcesoLegislativoComplet
w.aspx?q=BHGCbWrG7ukiUiW/WEuu/r7I8GQqjgVu6ZuRSZ5azXGhOIa3/ENf
pEN3iy1Ok4z8Z5p6GoyQkxbunCXJrQYbxg== [https://perma.cc/AKZ3-7ZPM]. 
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The history of prohibition throughout the 20th century reveals 
that even though drug legislation discursively aimed to protect 
health, it was actually grounded in prejudice and discrimination, not 
evidence.  Furthermore, prohibition as a legal regime did not reflect 
the constitutional inclusion of health as a fundamental right.  The 
few changes that reflect the introduction of a health-centered 
approach were overwhelmed by increasingly punitive measures.  
Like other fundamental rights, such as the right to a healthy 
environment (clearly damaged by chemical eradication of crops), 
the right to health has been sidelined by drug policymakers and 
enforcers, in favor of violent, repressive responses which still 
constitute the core of drug policy. 
Changes in the enforcement of prohibition at the end of the 20th 
century are also key to understanding Mexican drug policy.  Mexico 
acquired heightened importance as a trafficking route for Andean 
cocaine into the United States as the Caribbean Sea became 
increasingly patrolled in the 1980s and 1990s.48  Under changing 
circumstances, trafficking organizations eventually developed the 
capacity and need to recruit and train small private armies to protect 
their interests.  Eventually, organized crime organizations began 
recruiting state officials, particularly personnel assigned to 
prosecutorial tasks at the Attorney General’s office and highly 
trained members of the military.49  Criminal organizations that set 
up such militias used them to protect their routes, but also to expand 
their operations in detriment of their competitors.  Thus, by the 
beginning of the 21st century, regional pockets of violence appeared 
in contested territories.50 
As revenues from illicit activities increased, violence and other 
forms of criminality also increased, generating a sense of urgency 
 
 48 CARMEN BOULLOSA & MIKE WALLACE, A NARCO HISTORY: HOW THE UNITED 
STATES AND MEXICO JOINTLY CREATED THE MEXICAN DRUG WAR Ch. 4–6 
(Counterpoint Press, 2015). 
 49 See generally Richard Snyder and Angélica Durán Martínez, Does Illegality 
Breed Violence? Drug Trafficking and State-Sponsored Protection Rackets, 52 CRIME L. 
AND SOC. CHANGE 253, 262–267 (2009) (analyzing the emergence and breakdown of 
state-sponsored protection rackets in Mexico and Burma); Guillermo Trejo and 
Sandra Ley, Why Did Drug Cartels go to War in Mexico? Subnational Alternations, The 
Breakdown of Criminal Protection, and the Onset of Large-Scale Violence, 51 COMP. POL. 
STUD. 900 (2017) (showing that the removal of top- and midlevel officials within 
Mexico’s state attorney’s office and judicial police, incoming governors 
unknowingly triggered the outbreak of intercartel wars).  RICARDO RAPHAEL, HIJO 
DE LA GUERRA [SON OF WAR] (Seix Barral Biblioteca Breve, 2019), passim. 
 50 Snyder and Durán Martínez, supra note 49, at 267; Trejo and Ley, supra note 
49. 
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for the government to take further action to contain what was 
perceived as a rising wave of insecurity.  Rather than revisit the 
punitive strategy in light of its poor results and the changing 
context, the federal government’s reaction consisted of deepening 
the enforcement of prohibition to an unprecedented extent.  The 
decision, which took place in late 2006, enhanced the enforcement of 
prohibition to the extreme of using military forces to substitute 
police in broad portions of the territory.51  In retrospect, it is clear 
that the deepening of the war on drugs that started almost twelve 
years ago has been associated with the unprecedented escalation of 
violence suffered by the country.  In itself, this escalation has become 
a major public health problem in Mexico and has undermined the 
overall capacities of the federal and local governments.52 
Deepening enforcement of prohibition (2006–2018) 
Starting in late 2006, Mexico’s drug policy has moved actively 
into both more militarization and further centralization, with rather 
poor and even perverse results, incurring in serious violations of the 
Constitution. 
Enhanced militarization started in late 2006 when the federal 
government’s security cabinet announced the first “joint operation” 
with a state government to fight organized crime.  The Minister of 
Interior stated in a press conference: 
[W]e inform Mexicans of the launch of the Michoacan Joint 
Operation, with the deployment of more than 5,000 soldiers 
for this operation, activities such as eradication of illegal 
crops, the establishment of checkpoints to stop narcotic 
 
 51 Laura H. Atuesta, Capítulo IV: Militarización de la lucha contra el narcotráfico: 
los operativos militares como estrategia para el combate al crimen organizado [Chapter IV: 
Militarization of the fight against drug trafficking: military operations as a strategy against 
organized crime], in LAS VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLITICA PUBLICA DETRAS DE LA 
GUERRA CONTRA LAS DROGAS [THE VIOLENCE: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND 
THE WAR ON DRUGS] (Laura H. Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo eds., 2018). 
 52 See, e.g., Oliver D. Meza, La Retracción del Estado: Cómo la Violencia Afecta la 
Capacidad de Gobernar de los Municipios en México (Cuadernos de Trabajos del 
Programa de Política de Drogas del Centro de Investigación y Docencia 
Económicas, Cuaderno de Trabajo No. 17, 2016) [The Retraction of the State: How 
Violence Affects the Capacity of Municipalities in Mexico] (Working Papers of the Drug 
Policy Program of the Economic Research and Teaching Center, Working Paper No. 
17, 2016)] (supporting that violence is a major public health problem in Mexico 
affecting the capacities of the local governments). 
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trafficking on highways and secondary roads, the fulfillment 
of search and arrest warrants, as well as locating and 
dismantling points of drug sale will be carried out.53 
On January 4, 2007, the federal government sent another 3,500 
soldiers to Tijuana, a city less than an hour away from San Diego, 
California.54  On January 21, 2007, additional operations were 
announced in Guerrero, Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa.55  The 
operation in Guerrero initially included the participation of 6,388 
soldiers,56 and the Sierra Madre Joint Operation (Chihuahua, 
Durango, and Sinaloa) 9,054 soldiers.57  Between 2006 and 2011, the 
number of soldiers deployed across the country grew by 70 percent, 
reaching 52,690.58  According to the Ministry of Defense, in 2016 
there was an average of 52,000 soldiers deployed daily across the 
country, a number that does not include other federal forces such as 
the Marines or Federal Police. 59 
As different studies have shown, the 2006 decision to further 
militarize the war on drugs proved to be costly in human lives, rule 
of law, crime control, and institutional capacity.  State violence, 
especially in contexts of low institutional capacity and corruption, 
leads to further violence from criminal organizations that confront 
the State’s power by increasing their capacity to deploy violence.60  
The number of shoot-outs points to this fact.  In 2007, the military 
 
 53 Id.  [Translation by the authors]. 
 54 Atuesta, supra note 51. 
 55 Mensaje de Gabinete de Seguridad del Gobierno Federal [Message from the Security 
Cabinet of the Federal Government], PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA, (Jan. 21, 2007). 
 56 Atuesta, supra note 51. 
 57 Atuesta, supra note 51. 
 58 Carlos Silva Forné et al., Índice de letalidad 2008–2014: menos enfrentamientos, 
misma letalidad, más opacidad [Lethality index 2008–2014: less shooting, same lethality, 
more opacity], 25 PERFILES LATINOAMERICANOS 331 (2017), 
http://www.scielo.org.mx/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0188-
76532017000200331&lng=en&tlng=en [https://perma.cc/Z4UR-EHBS]. 
 59 CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., 
PERPETUAR EL FALLIDO MODELO DE SEGURIDAD [PERPETUATING THE FAILED SECURITY 
MODEL] 33 (2d ed. 2018), https://centroprodh.org.mx/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/InformeSeguridad.pdf  [https://perma.cc/2QX2-
SRWK]. 
 60 See generally BENJAMIN LESSING, MAKING PEACE IN DRUG WAR: CRACKDOWNS 
AND CARTELS IN LATIN AMERICA (2017) (arguing that aggressive crackdowns of drug 
cartels in Latin America provide an incentive for cartels to retaliate, whereas 
policies which encourage repression of cartel violence reduce the conflict between 
the cartels and the state).  See also Atuesta, supra note 51; Zedillo, supra note 6. 
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reported 48 shoot-outs; by 2011 they reported 1009.61  By 2015 the 
number was reduced substantially to 171, yet it remained much 
higher than at the onset of the war on drugs.62  The Federal Police 
also reports a tremendous increase in shoot-outs.  In 2007 it reported 
3; by 2012 it had increased to 143 and fell to a still very large 96 in 
2015.63 
The enforcement of drug laws using the military has had a 
negative effect both on police and military capacity.64  The growing 
use of the military is reflected in the increase in “mixed operation 
bases,” permanent infrastructure from which federal forces carry 
out public security tasks.65  In 2012, the National Defense Ministry 
(SEDENA) reported 75 such facilities; by 2016, there were 142 bases 
in 24 of Mexico’s 32 states.66  Thus, what at first was presented as a 
temporary measure—the use of the military forces to control drug 
cartels—is now a permanent feature of everyday life in large 
portions of Mexican territory. 
Further militarization of the war on drugs also had major 
repercussions on the way these institutions work.  Some studies 
suggest an increase over time in the use of lethal force, and a 
growing use of illegal practices like torture, due process violations 
and even the occurrence of extrajudicial killings.67  Another study 
suggests that torture and mistreatment grew significantly after 
2006.68  Using information from the only existing federal prison 
 
 61 Forné, supra note 58, at 339, graph 1. 
 62 Catalina Pérez Correa et al., Deadly Forces: Use of Lethal Force by Mexican 
Security Forces 2007–2015, in MEXICO’S HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS 33 (B. Frey & A. Anaya-
Múnoz eds., 2019). 
 63 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra 
note 59, at 133. 
 64 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra 
note 59, at 133. 
 65 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra 
note 59, at 31. 
 66 See CENTRO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS MIGUEL AGUSTÍN PRO JUÁREZ A.C., supra 
note 59, at 31. 
 67 On average, between 2007 and 2014, the Federal Police killed 4.8 civilians 
for every civilian they wounded in a shoot-out.  The Army killed, during that same 
period, an average of 7.9 civilians for every civilian wounded in shoot-outs.  The 
evolution of the use of lethal force is also worrisome.  For instance, in 2007 the Army 
averaged 1.6 civilians killed for every civilian wounded in a shoot-out.  By 2012 that 
number had risen to 14.7.  See Pérez Correa et al., supra note 62. 
 68 See Beatriz Magaloni et al., La tortura como método de investigación criminal: El 
impacto de la guerra contra las drogas en México [Torture as a method of criminal 
investigation: The impact of the war on drugs in Mexico], 25 POLÍTICA Y GOBIERNO 223 
(2018). 
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population survey, that study shows that mistreatment and violence 
perpetrated against detainees increased significantly after 
December of 2006.69  When observing specific types of rights 
violations and institutional involvement, disaggregated by type of 
crime, the data shows a general increase in alleged torture and other 
forms of human rights violations during detention, especially 
against people detained for drug crimes.70  Further, a Lancet 
Commission report published in 2016 found a significant rise in 
torture since 2006, estimating that it became 1.57 times more likely 
for a detainee to be subjected to torture or abuse during detention 
for a drug related crime after December 2006 than prior to that 
time.71 
Through prohibition, the Mexican State unintentionally created 
a black market where criminal organizations have thrived and 
prospered enormously.  The State has responded to the existence of 
the black market of its own creation and its violent participants by 
deploying the most lethal response possible, contributing to an 
unprecedented escalation of violence.  Today, violence has in itself 
become a major public health problem in Mexico and a factor for the 
undermining of the overall capacities of federal and local 
governments.72 
In 2009, the Petty Dealing Law73 transferred responsibility for 
prosecuting small-scale drug dealing and treatment of people who 
use drugs to Mexico’s 32 states.  One of the main objectives of that 
law was to free federal resources so these could focus on the most 
relevant drug crimes (such as large-scale trafficking, financing 
operations, etc.).  Data shows that after reaching its peak in 2007, the 
federal government steadily reduced the number detentions and 
prosecutions for drug crimes.  According to the General Attorney’s 
Office (PGR), while in 2007 there were more than 80,000 federal 
arrests for drug crimes, in 2014 there were less than 14,000.74  
 
 69 Id. at 238 
 70 Id. at 256. 
 71 Joanne Csete et al., Public health and international drug policy, 387 THE LANCET 
1427, 1434 (2016). 
 72 Meza, supra note 52. 
 73 The Petty Dealing Law, known in Spanish as the Ley de Narcomenudeo, 
was a series of reforms to different articles of the General Health Law and the 
Criminal Code. 
 74 Information request to Office of the General Prosecutor (PGR), No. 
0001700072215, 
http://www.infomex.org.mx/gobiernofederal/moduloPublico/rMedioElectP.act
ion?idFolioSol=0001700072215 [https://perma.cc/R7U7-QQTQ]. 
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However, the reform was not as successful in making federal 
institutions focus on the most important drug cases.  Although 
possession and use had been transferred to state jurisdictions 
beginning in 2009, they remained the main cause of federal arrests, 
constituting 56 percent of federal detentions in 2014.75  At the same 
time, State authorities drastically increased arrests for drug crimes.  
In 2011 official data reported 16,680 drug crimes as the cause for 
individuals kept in state prisons; by 2015 that number had risen to 
30,614, an increase of 83 percent in 4 years. 76 
While the Petty Dealing Law was meant to be a decentralizing 
one, ironically it has brought about an important encroachment of 
states’ powers by the federal government.  State authorities are 
responsible for prosecuting minor federal drug crimes.  This means 
that federal legislators in fact dictate key state criminal policy 
decisions.  Since the mid-nineteenth century and up until 2009, state 
criminal policy was strictly the domain of state legislatures.  By 
demanding that states persecute federal drug crimes, Congress 
forces local state authorities to allocate a substantial part of their 
human and institutional resources to persecuting (federal) drug 
crimes, regardless of local needs and context.  This represents a 
centralization of criminal policy decisions and a weakening of local 
autonomy unprecedented since the nineteenth century, when 
federalism was adopted in Mexico as a guiding principle of 
government.  This form of encroachment in state criminal policy has 
since expanded to other areas beyond drug crimes (such as 
kidnapping, crimes related to reproductive health, and other issues).  
Today, local jurisdictions are impeded by law to reform drug laws 
and are thus very limited when they attempt to adopt an approach 
to drug-related issues that responds to local needs.77  Attempts by 
state governments to adapt their criminal policy according to local 
 
 75 Id. 
 76 The National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) reports crimes 
sanctioned not people imprisoned.  See INEGI, CENSO NACIONAL DE PROCURACIÓN 
DE JUSTICIA ESTATAL 2015 [NATIONAL CENSUS OF STATE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE 2015], 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cnpje/2015/ 
[https://perma.cc/R7U7-QQTQ]. 
 77 For instance, this summer the Guerrero’s state congress voted to allow for 
legal cultivation and production of opioids for medical use.  The vote, however, 
does not become law, but rather simply initiates a legislative procedure before 
federal Congress.  See El Estado Mexicano de Guerrero abre el debate sobre la legalización 
de la amapola [The Mexican State of Guerrero opens the debate on the legalization of the 
poppy], EL PAÍS (Aug. 18, 2018), 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/08/18/mexico/1534623073_429355.html 
[https://perma.cc/L64N-ZYJ4]. 
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needs under the new law have been successfully challenged by the 
federal government.78 
Medical marijuana 
Mexico is sometimes perceived internationally as having a 
progressive position on marijuana, particularly after being one of 
the three countries calling for the UNGASS (2016) to revise the 
international treaty system stemming from the 1961 Convention.  
While some steps towards drug policy reform have taken place in 
Mexico, in practice they have not yet limited prohibition at all. 
Openness has been more discursive and symbolic than coherent and 
effective. 
A few months before UNGASS 2016 and after an important 
Supreme Court ruling that declared prohibition of cannabis for 
recreational use unconstitutional,79 two national dialogues on 
cannabis were called upon by the Federal Executive and by 
Congress.  From that process, legal reform of health and criminal 
laws was approved in 2017,80 allowing for the production and 
commercialization of cannabis for medical purposes.  The reform fell 
short of expectations, as it failed to address the Court’s ruling 
regarding recreational use of cannabis.81  Furthermore, after the 
bill’s approval more than a year ago, the government has failed to 
publish minimal regulations in order for licensing to begin.  The 
Federal Administration’s original proposal limited legalization to 
 
 78 See, e.g., Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 33/2010, Pleno de la Suprema 
Corte de Justicia de la Nación [SCJN], 30 de junio de 2011 (Mex.), 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?Asu
ntoID=122648 [https://perma.cc/U4YX-U4L3]; Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 
21/2010, Pleno de la SCJN, 28 de junio de 2011 (Mex.), 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/ConsultaTematica/PaginasPub/DetallePub.aspx?Asu
ntoID=120845 [https://perma.cc/6UZG-9KQX ]. 
 79 Amparo Indirecto 237/2014, Primera sala de la SCJN, 4 de noviembre de 
2015 (Mex.), https://www.sitios.scjn.gob.mx/encuentro_universitario/assets/ar-
237-2014-marihuana.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68]. 
 80 Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de la Ley 
General de Salud y Código Penal Federal [Decree by which various provisions of 
the General Health Law and Federal Criminal Code are amended and added], DOF 
19-06-2017 (Mex.), 
http://dof.gob.mx/nota_detalle.php?codigo=5487335&fecha=19/06/2017 
[https://perma.cc/UFM6-FFQ9]. 
 81 Id. 
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the sale of imported medical cannabis products.82  Congress, in 
contrast, approved national production and established a time limit 
for the Executive to publish the bylaws regulating the licensing 
process for medical cannabis.  Both production and importation are 
currently stalled, as the Executive refuses to publish the required 
bylaws, even though the end of the grace period established by 
Congress is long overdue.  Consequently, in practice, even medical 
cannabis remains illegal in Mexico. 
The most significant steps towards changing drug policy have 
come from the Supreme Court.  In 2015, a first historic ruling held 
that the administrative ban on marijuana use for recreational 
purposes was unconstitutional, because it disproportionately 
restricted the fundamental right to freely develop one’s 
personality.83  Four more rulings holding that a blanket prohibition 
of cannabis is unconstitutional have since followed,84 making the 
courts decision a binding criterion for all lower tribunals to follow.85  
However, not only does the law require five consecutive rulings for 
the Supreme Court, a separate super-majoritarian vote by the Court 
is needed to strike down any law (otherwise the rulings only protect 
the plaintiffs and the law remains in force).86  The Court has already 
formally notified Congress of the unconstitutionality of cannabis 
prohibition, but Congress is still discussing initiatives for reform 
 
 82 Id. 
 83 Amparo Indirecto 237/2014, supra note 79.  The ruling, commonly known 
as SMART, can be found here: 
http://www.smartclub.mx/uploads/8/7/2/7/8727772/doc.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68]. 
 84 Amparo Indirecto 637/2017, Primera sala de la SCJN, 16 de mayo de 2018 
(Mex.), 
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/2018-
04/AR-623-2017-180430.pdf [https://perma.cc/RP8T-NB68 ]; Amparo Indirecto 
1115/2017, Primera sala de la SCJN, 11 de marzo de 2018 (Mex.), 
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/2018-
03/AR-1115-17-180316.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MJ3-9Y9G]; Amparo Indirecto 
1163/2017, Segunda sala de la SCJN, 12 de julio de 2017 (Mex.), 
https://www.scjn.gob.mx/sites/default/files/listas/documento_dos/2018-
06/AR-1163-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6HL-YKZ2]. 
 85 Reitera Primera Sala inconstitucionalidad de la prohibición absoluta del consumo 
recreativo de marihuana e integra jurisprudencia [First Chamber reiterates 
unconstitutionality of the absolute prohibition of the recreational use of marijuana and 
integrates jurisprudence], BOLETÍN OFICIAL [OFFICIAL BULLETIN] No. 140/180, 31 de 
octubre de 2018 (Mex.), 
http://www.internet2.scjn.gob.mx/red2/comunicados/noticia.asp?id=5785 
[https://perma.cc/9J67-LUUW]. 
 86 CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 107, II, para. 3 
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(which are expected to pass before April 2020).87  If Congress does 
not act soon, the Court will make a general declaration which will 
strike marihuana prohibition from the law. 
Legalizing the possession and use as well as regulating the 
supply of cannabis is not only a policy imperative in Mexico today, 
it is also a constitutional one, but Mexico’s rather cumbersome 
constitutional justice system has so far failed to make it a reality. 
3. PROHIBITION, VIOLENCE AND PEOPLE WHO USE DRUGS 
Prohibition and its purported enforcement have had devastating 
effects in Mexico.  As a policy, drug prohibition has failed to protect 
public and individual health and undermined State institutions.   
The decision of the Mexican government to deepen the enforcement 
of prohibition and persecute organized criminal organizations, 
using the most violent tools at hand, rather than undermining its 
access to enormous economic resources, has driven violence to 
unprecedented levels, affecting individual lives and communities 
deeply. 
This section reviews some of the most negative consequences of 
current policies, specifying how current laws and the application of 
policies explain them.  It shows how homicidal violence since the 
outset of the war on drugs has risen to the point of becoming a public 
health problem, as well as causing the displacement and 
disappearance of thousands of people.  It then explains how, 
although current laws and policies purportedly aim to protect the 
health of both potential users and people who use drugs, they in fact 
negatively affect the rights of both these groups. 
The epidemic of violence.  Violence as a harm to public health: 
homicides, internally displaced populations and disappearances 
In Mexico, prohibition has led to an unprecedented human 
tragedy as shown by the massive numbers of people killed, 
displaced or disappeared.  Sadly, the government’s wrongheaded 
 
 87 Silvia Arellano, Corte da prórroga a Senado para regular marihuana, MILENIO 
DIARIO (Nov. 2, 2019), https://www.milenio.com/politica/marihuana-corte-
prorroga-senado-regular [https://perma.cc/8L62-RU7A]. 
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drug policy seems to be at the root of the current Mexican security 
and justice crisis. 
Between 2006 and 2017, 254,633 homicides occurred in the 
country.88  In 2006 the National Institute of Statistics (INEGI) 
reported 10,452 homicides.89  By 2011, it reached an annual peak of 
27,213 and then waned slightly during the following years with 
24,559 homicides reported in 2016.90  But the trend has accelerated 
upward again in 2017 when, according to the latest reports, the 
figure reached over 31,000 homicides.91  For more than two decades 
Mexico had enjoyed a sustained and prolonged drop in homicide 
rates, reaching a historic low with 8 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2007.92  As the bulk of federal forces were deployed to 
enforce prohibition that trend, however, was abruptly ended and 
homicide rates rapidly started to increase—by 50 percent in 2008 
and by the same percentage again in 2009, when that rate reached 20 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants (a different estimate placed 
homicide rates at 24 per 100,000 in 2009).93 
In several studies, the government’s operativos conjuntos—the 
core of Mexico’s strategy against organized crime involving drug 
trafficking—have been causally linked to the rise in homicides.94   
 
 88 INEGI, MORTALIDAD, CONJUNTO DE DATOS: DEFUNCIONES POR HOMICIDIOS, 
INFORMACIÓN DE 1990 A 2018 [MORTALITY, DATA SET: HOMICIDES, INFORMATION FROM 
1990 TO 2018] (2019), 
http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad/
defuncioneshom.asp?s=est [https://perma.cc/SD8C-V626]. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. 
 91 While most of these deaths were men, homicide rates for women have risen 
at a similar pace, with 1,298 deaths in 2006 and a peak of 3,324 in 2017.  See id. 
 92 Fernando Escalante, Homicidios 2008-2009. La muerte tiene permiso [Homicide 
2008–2009. Death has permission], NEXOS (Jan. 1, 2011), 
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14089 [https://perma.cc/M4NE-BKAS]. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Several studies have established some type of causality between the 
security strategy implemented by the 2006–2012 administration and the increase in 
violence observed in the country since 2008.  See, e.g., Atuesta, supra note 51; Laura 
Atuesta & Aldo Ponce, Meet the Narco: Increased Competition Among Criminal 
Organizations and the Explosion of Violence in Mexico, 18 GLOB. CRIME 375, 376 (2017) 
(explaining that increased intervention by law enforcement increases the number 
of assassinations and unrest, which leads to the creation of more criminal 
organizations); Gabriela Calderón et al., The Beheading of Criminal Organizations and 
the Dynamics of Violence in Mexico, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1455, 1456 (2015) (linking 
the dramatic increase in homicide rates in 2006 to the start of President Calderon’s 
campaign against drug cartels); Valeria Espinosa & Donald B. Rubin, Did the 
Military Interventions in the Mexican Drug War Increase Violence?, 69 AM. STATISTICIAN 
17, 24 (2015) (claiming military intervention in the drug war caused in increase in 
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The mechanisms through which this happens are still unclear, but 
existing data highlights two main findings: First, a rise in homicide 
rates takes place in localities where operativos conjuntos against 
organized crime have been deployed.  Second, that increase is more 
pronounced when military forces are involved (as opposed to 
federal civil forces like the Federal Police).95 
The increase in homicides has been so pronounced that it has 
had a direct negative impact on life expectancy: for the first time in 
over six decades, life expectancy dropped in Mexico.  Though the 
national drop was only 0.6 percent between 2005 and 2010, certain 
regions most affected by the war on drugs showed a higher 
decrease.96  In Chihuahua, Sinaloa, and Durango life expectancy 
decreased by three years over the same period.97  This drop in life 
expectancy occurred at a time when there were substantial positive 
changes in other health indicators and causes of death in the 
country.  This means that the possible positive effects of inclusive 
health policies and their improvements have been exceeded and 
overwhelmed by the negative health impact of the violence caused 
by the attempts to enforce the ill-conceived drug policy. 
Moreover, violence permeates the population and creates 
numerous health problems: somatic, psychological and behavioral.   
Homicides are not the sole negative impact of drug-war-driven 
violence on public health.  Violence begets violence: young people 
 
the average homicide rate); Javier Osorio, The Contagion of Drug Violence: 
Spatiotemporal Dynamics of the Mexican War on Drugs, 59 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1403, 
1407 (2015) (proposing a theory of criminal competition whereby government 
intervention reduces the power of one criminal organization and therefore 
encourages a rival organization to strike its weakened competitor); Brian J. Phillips, 
How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking 
Organizations in Mexico, 77 J. POLITICS 324, 326 (2015) (explaining why leadership 
decapitation can sometimes have the unintended effect of increasing levels of 
violence); José Merino, Los operativos conjuntos y la tasa de homicidios: una medición 
[Joint operations and the homicide rate: a measurement], NEXOS, (June 1, 2011), 
https://www.nexos.com.mx/?p=14319 [https://perma.cc/2TRJ-ZEW7] (using 
statistical tools to argue that the strong correlation between government 
intervention and violence is causal). 
 95 On average, during the first five years of the drug war, each shoot-out 
between authorities and organized criminals produced a 6 percent rise in the 
homicide rate in that locality within three months.  The compound increase is 
staggering in localities with tens or even hundreds of such exchanges.  Where the 
armed forces are used, the average increase is by 8 percent, but when the Army is 
used, the increase is of 9 percent.  See Atuesta, supra note 51, at 24–26. 
 96 José Manuel Aburto et al., Homicides in Mexico Reversed Life Expectancy Gains 
for Men and Slowed Them for Women, 2000–10, 35 HEALTH AFF. 88, 88 (2016). 
 97 Id. at 90–91. 
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who are victims of violence are at higher risk of perpetrating 
violence with fire-arms themselves.98  Also, being a victim of 
violence raises the risk of depression, alcohol abuse, suicidal 
behavior, and psychological problems, among other negative 
consequences on health.99  For instance, exposure to the recent 
escalation of violence in Mexico is associated with lower weight at 
birth of children born to women of scarce economic resources and 
children born to women with mental health problems.100  Merely 
witnessing violence may affect the health of the exposed population 
by increasing the rates of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and 
depression.101  A 2015 study analyzed not only the mortality rates in 
Mexico, but also the psychological wellbeing of those affected by 
violence.102  In this study, researchers measured the fear and 
perceived vulnerability (feeling unsafe) in the population. 103  The 
findings show that between 2005 and 2014 the average number of 
years that individuals live feeling at risk from violence increased 
considerably.104 
 
 
 98 See, e.g., Paula Braveman & Laura Gottlieb, The Social Determinants of Health: 
It’s Time to Consider the Causes of the Causes, 129 PUB. HEALTH REP. 19, 22 (2014) (“For 
instance, exposure to violence can increase the likelihood that young people will 
perpetrate gun violence”). 
 99 Jonathan R. T. Davidson et al., The Association of Sexual Assault and Attempted 
Suicide Within the Community, 53 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 550, 553 (1996). 
 100 See Ryan Brown, The Mexican Drug War and Early-Life Health: The Impact of 
Violent Crime on Birth Outcomes, 55 DEMOGRAPHY 319, 326 (2018) (discussing the 
relationship between in utero exposure to violence and birth weight). 
 101 See, e.g., Stephen L. Buka et al., Youth Exposure to Violence: Prevalence, Risks, 
and Consequences, 71 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 298, 302-303 (2001) (analyzing the 
mental health effects on children and adolescents who witnessed community 
violence). 
 102 Vladimir Canudas-Romo et al., Mexico’s Epidemic of Violence and its Public 
Health Significance on Average Length of Life, 71 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY 
HEALTH 188 (2017). 
 103 Id. at 189 (defining vulnerability as the respondent’s perception of crime 
based on answers to the question “In terms of crime, how do you consider living in 
your state and in your home?” with two response options, vulnerable and safe). 
 104 Id. at 192.  In 2014, female life expectancy at age 20 was 59.5 years (95 
percent CI 59.0 to 60.1); 71 percent of these years (42.3 years, 41.6 to 43.0) were spent 
with perceived vulnerability of violence taking place in the state and 26 percent at 
the home (15.3 years, 15 to 15.8).  For males, life expectancy at age 20 was 54.5 years 
(53.7 to 55.1); 64 percent of these years (34.6 years, 34.0 to 35.4) were lived with 
perceived vulnerability of violence at the state and 20 percent at the home (11.1 
years, 10.8 to 11.5). 
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Graph 1: Yearly deaths due to illegal drugs, homicides and other 
public health issues105 
 
Violence among cartels and between cartels and government 
forces places innocent people in the crossfire.  Because of this, an 
increasing number of people leave their homes in search of refuge.  
Forced displacement is also a tactic used by criminals to empty 
ranches and villages in order to grab land and natural resources.  A 
2017 report by the Mexican Commission for the Defense and 
Promotion of Human Rights concluded that at least 329,917 people 
have been internally displaced in Mexico since 2006.106  This NGO 
 
 105 Chart created with data from the INEGI’s record of homicides from 1990 
to 2016 and the 2006-2016 mortality databases from the National System for Health 
Information.  Conjunto de Datos: Defunciones por Homicidios, [Dataset: Deaths by 
Homicide], INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA Y GEOGRAFÍA, [NATIONAL INSTITUTE 
OF STATISTICS AND GEOGRAPHY], 
https://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/olap/proyectos/bd/continuas/mortalidad
/defuncioneshom.asp?s=est [https://perma.cc/SD8C-V626]. 
 106 COMISIÓN MEXICANA DE DEFENSA Y PROMOCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 
(CMDPDH), EPISODIOS DE DESPLAZAMIENTO INTERNO FORZADO MASIVO EN MÉXICO 
INFORME 2017 [EPISODES OF FORCED AND MASSIVE INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN MEXICO. 
2017 REPORT] 8 (2017), http://www.cmdpdh.org/publicaciones-pdf/cmdpdh-
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registered 25 episodes of mass forced displacements in 2017 alone.107   
According to the same report, the main—but not the only—cause of 
displacement that year was violence generated by organized armed 
criminal groups, which accounts for 68 percent of the total number 
of episodes.108  Another study states that there were 123,000 
internally displaced persons in 2010, and that number has increased 
steadily, reaching 311,000 by 2016.109  Between 2006 and 2015, 
population rates decreased in 691 municipalities, 28 percent of the 
country’s total number, with most of these municipalities located in 
three regions most affected by violence.110  Overall, the number of 
people leaving violent municipalities in Mexico is four to five times 
higher than that of those leaving non-violent municipalities with 
similar socio-economic conditions.  However, to date, the 
government only acknowledges a fraction of the internally 
displaced population making it difficult to assess and address the 
magnitude of the problem. 111 
People who have been forced to move rarely have access to legal 
mechanisms or institutions for protection or assistance.  Local 
 
informe-de-desplazamiento-interno-masivo-en-mexico-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E675-DQ5Z]. 
 107 A mass episode of forced internal displacement occurs when families (in a 
number equaling or greater than ten) or groups of people (equaling or greater than 
fifty individuals in total) are obligated to collectively abandon their place of 
residence, as a reactive or preventative measure when faced with a situation of 
widespread violence.  The episodes registered in 2017 displaced around 20,390 
people and affected at least nine states, twenty-seven municipalities, and seventy-
nine localities.  See id. at 9. 
 108 Other causes registered over the year were political violence, social 
conflict, territorial conflict, and mining extraction projects.  Furthermore, the 
CMDPDH’s research identified the forms of violence that originated or that were 
present during these displacements.  The most frequently registered were: armed 
attacks against communities; armed confrontations between criminal groups or 
between these and state agents; threats and intimidation; burning or destruction of 
houses, crops, businesses, and vehicles.  See id. at 10. 
 109 These figures were obtained by the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) and are available on their Mexico profile page at: http://internal-
displacement.org/countries/mexico/ [https://perma.cc/MAU2-PACU].  Most 
recent 2016 estimates are based on a preview of a forthcoming report prepared by 
the CMDPHD. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See, e.g., Laura H. Atuesta & Dusan Paredes, Do Mexicans Flee from Violence? 
The Effects of Drug-Related Violence on Migration Decisions in Mexico, 42 J. ETHN. MIGR. 
STUD. 480 (2015) (“However, up to now, the government has not recognised the 
existence of the internally displaced population (IDP) and there is no data to assess 
the magnitude of the problem neither to estimate the economic consequences of 
that displacement.”). 
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governments often lack the capacity to guarantee and protect the 
rights of displaced populations.  In addition to problems related to 
their personal safety, internally displaced populations need 
assistance with basic survival issues, such as shelter, health services, 
drinking water, sanitation, clothing, and food.  The existing health 
care services in Mexico, however, often lack the capacity to respond 
to these basic needs, much less provide broader psychological and 
physical care for this population. 
In addition to homicides and displacements, the war on drugs 
has also left the country with a large number of missing persons.   
According to the Mexican government, since 2006, over 35,000 
people have disappeared in the country, and the number seems to 
be growing.112  From 2006 to 2012, 13,767 people disappeared.113  
From December 2012 to April 2018, 23,236 people were reported 
missing or disappeared.114  Many of these cases are accused of being 
enforced disappearances, in which presumably authorities were 
involved.115  Unfortunately very few cases are investigated.  For 
example, by 2016, Mexico had informed the United Nations of only 
fourteen convictions for enforced disappearances, six of which 
occurred before 2006.116 
 
 112 See SECRETARIADO EJECUTIVO DEL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD 
PÚBLICA, REGISTRO NACIONAL DE DATOS DE PERSONAS EXTRAVIADAS o DESAPARECIDAS 
(RNPED) [NATIONAL REGISTRY OF DATA OF LOST  OR MISSING PERSONS (RNPED)], 
http://secretariadoejecutivo.gob.mx/rnped/datos-abiertos.php 
[https://perma.cc/E675-DQ5Z]. 
 113 See Open Society Justice Initiative, Corrupción que Mata: Por qué México 
Necesita un Mecanismo Internacional para Combatir la Impunided [Corruption that Kills: 
Why Mexico Requires an International Mechanism to Combat Impunity], 22 (2018), 
https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads/39bec249-a57e-4f26-aeaa-
160acd0088dd/corruption-that-kills-es-20180502.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YLL-
RGXJ]. 
 114 See RNPED, supra note 112. 
 115 According to a study by the Observatory on Disappearances and Impunity, 
out of 548 cases of disappearances committed between 2005 and 2015 in the state of 
Nuevo Leon and adjacent states, 46.7 percent had a state authority reported as the 
offender.  See Observatorio de Desapariciones e Impunidad, Informe Sobre 
Desapariciones En El Estado De Nuevo León, 2016 [Observatory of Disappearences and 
Impunity, Report On Disappearances In The State Of Nuevo León, 2016] (FLACSO 2016), 
http://www.flacso.edu.mx/sites/default/files/170616_resumen_informe_nl_vf.
pdf [https://perma.cc/R8NY-TSQ8] (presenting the study report). 
 116 Open Society Justice Initiative, supra note 113, at 25. 
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People who use drugs 
If the constitutional right to health were taken seriously, people 
who use drugs would be treated very differently.  In practice, drug 
users are not the subjects of a serious public health policy; rather, 
they are most often treated as criminals.  Although technically the 
use of illegal drugs is not a crime, the criminalization of all drug-
related conduct—including possession—leads effectively to the 
criminalization of individuals who use drugs.  People who use 
drugs are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary application of state 
force, including illegal detention, torture, and imprisonment.  
Existing data suggests that people who use drugs are often the main 
target of repressive efforts by government.  At the same time, health 
services offered to people with problematic drug use are scarce, 
inadequate, and tend to be poorly regulated and policed, be they 
private or public.117 
People who use drugs and the criminal justice system 
People who use drugs are the most frequently targeted by the 
criminal justice system for breaking drug laws.  Although drug use 
is not a crime, users are forced to participate in a market that is 
clandestine and controlled by criminal organizations.  They are 
directly brought into the criminal justice system when charged with 
drug possession, which is a crime in Mexico.  Because possession 
necessarily precedes use, people who use drugs formally commit a 
crime every time they use.118 
Possessing any amount of illegal drugs warrants arrest and the 
opening of a criminal investigation file, regardless of circumstance.   
According to Mexico’s Health Law, possession of up to 5 grams of 
marijuana, 0.5 grams of cocaine, 50 milligrams of heroin, 40 
milligrams of methamphetamines or 2 grams of opium, remains a 
crime and must be investigated by the public prosecutor, but “shall 
 
 117 See EN BUSCA DE LOS DERECHOS: USUARIOS DE DROGAS Y LAS RESPUESTAS 
ESTATALES EN AMÉRICA LATINA [IN THE QUEST FOR RIGHTS: DRUG USERS AND STATE 
RESPONSES IN LATIN AMERICA] (Catalina Pérez Correa & Coletta Youngers eds., 2015), 
http://www.drogasyderecho.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/reporte-
completo.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ3C-YXCE]. 
 118 Id. 
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not be punished.”119  This means that a criminal investigation is to 
be opened and the accused person may be subject to temporary 
detention, especially if caught in the act of possession.  However, if, 
upon conclusion of the investigation, the amounts are shown to be 
within the thresholds, the case will not be filed before a judge but 
instead reported to health authorities.120  If the amounts possessed 
are above the thresholds—which are notoriously low compared to 
thresholds established in other Latin American countries like 
Uruguay or Colombia—mere possession will result in prosecution 
and incarceration. This threshold system is often invoked as a 
progressive policy adopted with the 2009 amendment to the General 
Health Law to decriminalize possession.  However, corruption, 
inadequate police training,121 and an inefficient justice system have 
rendered depenalization mute.  In this context, the Petty Dealing 
Law has increased harm to people who use drugs.  Lacking proper 
skills to investigate crime and often asked to reach arrest quotas, 
regardless of the specific crimes, police and prosecutors find in 
young people who use drugs easy cases, as drug possession requires 
no investigation beyond possession itself.  The ease with which 
police can report drug amounts which exceed these thresholds 
makes extortion by police a common practice.122 
According to the National Institute of Statistics and Geography 
(INEGI), in 2015, states reported 50,083 criminal investigations 
opened in state jurisdictions for drug related crimes.123 These 
investigations were opened under the Petty Dealing Law.  Simple 
possession—that is, possession without intent to sell or supply—
represented 65 percent of the open investigations, while possession 
 
 119 See Ley General de Salud [General Health Law] (LGS) art. 479, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 12 de julio de 2018 (Mex.), 
http://www.salud.gob.mx/cnts/pdfs/LEY_GENERAL_DE_SALUD.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6BXT-H9J8]. 
 120 Id. 
 121 See Annick Borquez et al., The Effect of Public Health-Oriented Drug Law 
Reform on HIV Incidence in People who Inject Drugs in Tijuana, Mexico: an Epidemic 
Modelling Study, THE LANCET PUBLIC HEALTH (2018), 
https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanpub/PIIS2468-2667(18)30097-
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J5P-TTQ5]. 
 122 EN BUSCA DE LOS DERECHOS, [IN THE QUEST FOR RIGHTS], supra note 117. 
 123 See Censo Nacional de Gobierno, Seguridad Pública y Sistema Penitenciario 
Estatales 2016 [National Government Census, Public Safety and the State Penitentiary 
System 2016], INEGI, 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/201
6/ [https://perma.cc/7WR4-XQ3E]. 
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with intent to sell or supply represented 17.5 percent.124  Sale and 
supply comprised a mere 1.7 percent of all local investigations.125 
Regarding incarceration, many states do not keep track of the 
specific drug related criminal offences committed and sanctioned in 
their prisons.126 Where information is available, possession is 
consistently the most frequently sanctioned drug crime.  As to what 
type of drug is involved, in 40 percent of the cases the information 
is not available.127  Where information is available, marijuana is the 
most frequent substance (32 percent), followed by cocaine (13 
percent) and methamphetamines (12 percent).128 
Once processed through the criminal justice system, people who 
use drugs face a prison system that is hazardous to health.  Prisons 
are high-risk environments for numerous diseases.  There is a high 
prevalence of HIV due to shared use of needles for drug injection 
and tattooing with homemade and unsterilized kits, as well as high-
risk sex and rape.129  According to the UN, globally, in 2012, the 
prevalence rates among the prison population of HIV was 6.7 
percent, Hepatitis B was 4.4 percent and Hepatitis C reached 10 
percent, much higher than those seen in the general population (i.e. 
HIV prevalence is 0.3 percent for the general population).130  
Tuberculosis in prisons is, on average, twenty-three times higher 
than in the general population.131  In 2008, the likelihood of dying if 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 The remaining 16 percent were classified as “other” which could refer to 
investigations initiated for possession under the thresholds or else investigations of 
drug crimes which were deemed to fall within federal jurisdiction and accordingly 
transferred.  See id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 See SERGIO CHAPARRO & CATALINA PÉREZ CORREA, SOBREDOSIS CARCELARIA Y 
POLÍTICA DE DROGAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA [PRISON OVERDOSE AND DRUG POLICY IN LATIN 
AMERICA] (Dejusticia, Working Paper No. 41, 2017), 
https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/SobredosiscarcelariaypoliticadedrogasenAmericaLatin
a.pdf?x54537 [https://perma.cc/W5SN-NSNS]. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Iacopo Baussano et al., Tuberculosis Incidence in Prisons: A Systematic Review, 
7 PLOS MEDICINE (2010), 
https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/article?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.100038
1 [https://perma.cc/9AQQ-GSWL]. 
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one was in a Mexican prison was five times greater than if one was 
not in a Mexican prison.132 
 
Graph 2: Micro-dealing crimes sanctioned in state prisons, by sex, 
2015 (local jurisdiction)133 
 
These health risks are shared by prison personnel and families 
who are in frequent contact with the prison population.  Mexico 
City’s prisons alone have over 3 million visitors per year.134  For 
families of inmates, incarceration also has severe economic, health, 
and social costs.  The imprisonment of a family member often leads 
to economic vulnerability and stigmatization.  This is particularly 
 
 132 Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, Índice De Desempeño Del Sistema Penal 
[Performance Index Of The Criminal Justice System Index], MÉXICO EVALÚA (Nov. 10, 
2010),  https://www.mexicoevalua.org/2010/11/10/indice-de-desempeno-del-
sistema-penal/ [ https://perma.cc/JG53-EB36]. 
 133 National Census of Government, Public Security and State Prison Systems 
of 2016, INEGI, 
http://www.beta.inegi.org.mx/proyectos/censosgobierno/estatal/cngspspe/201
6/ [https://perma.cc/7WR4-XQ3E]. 
 134 Catalina Pérez Correa, Las mujeres invisibles: Los costos de la prisión y los 
efectos indirectos en las mujeres [Invisible women: the costs of prison and the indirect effects 
on women] (Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Working Paper No. IBD-DP-405, 
2015), https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7235 [https://perma.cc/28FJ-
FGD3]. 
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true for women, as they are usually the ones who provide basic 
necessities for their family members in prison.135 
Prevention, treatment and harm reduction for people who 
use drugs 
Evolution of drug use in Mexico cannot be properly assessed, as 
the national surveys regarding drug use published over the years 
are not comparable to each other.136  Nevertheless, the available data 
suggests that use of illegal drugs has increased, despite harsh 
prohibition policies, as Table 1 shows. 137  It is important to point out 
that only 0.6 percent of the population reported a drug use disorder 
(1.1 percent men, 0.2 percent in women).138 
 
 
 135 A 2014 survey of people visiting family members in Mexican prisons 
indicated similar kinds of challenges in that setting.  Of the visitors, who were 
mostly women, more than 50 percent said that because of the imprisonment of a 
spouse or family member they had had to get a job or an additional job.  By contrast 
41 percent said that they had lost a job, more than 18 percent said that they had had 
to move, and almost 40 percent said the imprisonment had impeded their ability to 
care for their children or grandchildren.  A range of health problems also 
disproportionately affected spouses of those incarcerated, including high blood 
pressure and depression.  Id. 
 136 Beatriz C. Labate & Pamela Ruiz Flores López, Midiendo el uso de Drogas 
ilegales en México: Reflexiones sobre las Encuestas Nacionales de Adicciones y una encuesta 
independiente [Measuring the use of illegal Drugs In Mexico: Reflections on National 
Addiction Surveys and an independent survey] (Drug Policy Workshop (PPD) CIDE, 
Working Paper No. 13, 2015), 
http://ppd.cide.edu/documents/302668/0/Midiendo%20el%20uso%20de%20dr
ogas%20ilegales%20en%20México.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4XZ-E8VN ]. 
 137 According to the National Survey on Consumption of Drugs, Alcohol and 
Tobacco 2016-2017 (ENCODAT), use by women increased disproportionately, with 
any drug increasing from 0.7 percent to 1.3 percent, illegal drugs from 0.4 percent 
to 1.1 percent and marijuana from 0.3 to 0.9 percent.  Youth use (12-17 years) has 
also gone up from 0.6 percent to 3.1 percent for any drug, 1.5 percent to 2.9 percent 
for illegal drugs, and 0.6 percent to 2.1 percent in marijuana.  The group with the 
highest rates of use remains men between 18-34 years.  Instituto Nacional de 
Psiquiatría Ramón de la Fuente Muñiz et al., Encuesta Nacional de Consumo de Drogas, 
Alcohol y Tabaco 2016–2017 (Encodat): Reporte de Drogas [National Drug, Alcohol, and 
Tobacco Consumption Survey 2016-2017 (ENCODAT): Drug Report] (2017), [herinafter 
ENCODAT] https://www.gob.mx/salud%7Cconadic/acciones-y-
programas/encuesta-nacional-de-consumo-de-drogas-alcohol-y-tabaco-encodat-
2016-2017-136758 [https://perma.cc/NRN3-XKRU]. 
 138 Id. 
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Table 1: Percentage of adult population (12–65 years old) who used 
at least once in the last year139 
 
Drug 2002 2008 2011 2016 
Illegal drugs  0.8 1.4 1.5 2.7 
Marijuana 0.6 1 1.2 2.1 
Cocaine 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.8 
Methamphetamine - 0.1 0.2 0.2 
 
Specific regions have more pronounced increases than the 
national average, and these regions are those in the country 
suffering the most from violence due to trafficking and prohibition 
enforcement.140  Violence and its impact on well-being could partly 
explain the possible rise, but it should not be discarded that efforts 
to intercept drugs going to the U.S. border lead to substances being 
retained and dispersed in the Mexican territory.  This especially 
appears to be the case in border cities like Tijuana.141 
Drug use in Mexico, however, is still below global rates, and 
even drug dependence estimates for Mexico (6 percent of Mexico’s 
people use drugs) are significantly lower than worldwide estimates 
(11 percent).142 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 In the North Central region of Mexico, for example, rates rose from 1.6 
percent to 3.3 percent.  The North-West and North-East regions are also above the 
national averages going from 2.8 percent to 3.5 percent and staying at 2.4 percent 
respectively.  The West has also seen an enormous rise from 3.6 percent.  Other 
border states in the North that already had high rates, such as Baja California (from 
4.1 percent to 4.4 percent) and Chihuahua (from 3.3 to 3.4 percent) remain so.  See 
ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 141 As the United States has tightened security along the border, drugs have 
pooled on the Mexican side.  Mid and low-level distributors are pushing not only 
heroin, but also meth out into the local markets, particularly along the border.  This 
has been documented in local newspapers.  See Yerson Martínez, Aumenta BC el 
consumo de heroína y “cristal” [BC increases the consumption of heroin and “crystal”], 
FRONTERA INFO (Aug. 30, 2016), 
http://www.frontera.info/EdicionEnLinea/Notas/Noticias/30082016/1121859-
Aumenta-BC-el-consumo-de-heroina-y-cristal.html) [https://perma.cc/GA29-
YZKT].  It has also been documented in treatment centers.  See Eneida Sánchez 
Zambrano & Rubén Gómez, Adicciones en Baja California, ausentes en políticas públicas 
[Addiction in Baja California, absentabsence in public policies], LA JORNADA BAJA 
CALIFORNIA (Feb. 13, 2015), http://jornadabc.mx/tijuana/13-02-2015/adicciones-
en-baja-california-ausentes-en-politicas-publicas) [https://perma.cc/JR4M-
XDW4]. 
 142 According to UNODC’s World Drug Report 2017, it is estimated that 5 
percent or a quarter of a billion people between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four 
years, used at least one drug in 2015, while 3.8 percent of the adult population used 
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The government’s investment in prevention and treatment pales 
in comparison to its investment in punishment.  Between 2006 and 
2012, 97.07 percent ($790 billion pesos) of total spending on drug 
policy was allocated to law enforcement while only 2.91 percent ($23 
billion pesos) was spent on prevention and treatment (including 
related human rights programs).143  Yet the prevention effort, as 
small as it is, seems to yield results: 5.1 percent of those exposed to 
prevention programs report having used drugs, compared to 12.3 
percent of people who have not had access to prevention services 
and campaigns.144  Positive outcomes of prevention are more 
noticeable amongst youths: 3.3 percent of 12—17-year-olds reported 
as using drugs after exposure to prevention programs, in contrast to 
the 10.3 percent who used drugs but had not been exposed to 
prevention programs.145  In spite of these tangible results, the 
percentage of the population exposed to prevention programs has 
grown only marginally between 2011 and 2016 (from 43.3 to 47.1 
percent).146 
People who suffer from problematic drug use have limited 
access to treatment, particularly for science-based services.  
According to the ENCODAT, of the people who reported 
problematic drug use, only one out of five (20.4 percent) received 
treatment (22.1 percent of men, 12.8 percent of women), and only 
24.5 percent completed it.147  Several barriers to accessing treatment 
exist, especially for women.148  For people who wanted to receive 
 
marijuana.  Mexico’s numbers are well below that, at 2.7 percent for all illegal drugs 
and 2.1 percent for marijuana.  See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 
WORLD DRUG REPORT 9 (2017), 
https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_1_EXSUM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6ZX-U2FA]. 
 143 Gabriel Purón-Cid, El Impacto Económico de una Política de Drogas 
Prohibicionista 2006–2012 [The Economic Impact of a Drug Prohibition Policy 2006-2012] 
(Drug Policy Workshop (PPD) CIDE, Working Paper No. 3, CIDE 2014). 
 144 See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 145 See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 146 See ENCODAT, supra note 137, at Cuadro TD10 (“Población de 12 a 65 años 
que le han ofrecido alguna droga regalada o comprada según sexo y edad” 
[“Population ages 12 to 65 years old who have been offered, given, or bought any 
drug, according to sex and age”].). 
 147 We don’t know what the rate of relapse was.  Surprisingly, even though 
women access treatment much less frequently than men, of those women who did 
get treatment, 90.5 percent completed it, while only 19.8 percent of men did.   See 
ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 148 According to the ENCODAT, supra note 137, 8 percent of people who use 
drugs and 20.4 percent of people with drug use disorder underwent treatment. 
However, numbers are two or three times lower for women (3.9 percent of women 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol41/iss1/4
2019] Drug Policy in Mexico 143 
treatment, the lack of economic resources, distance, lack of quality 
of services, and stigma associated with drug use were identified as 
being amongst the main barriers to accessing treatment.149 
Problematic drug use is managed through special units in public 
health centers.  The great majority of these are outpatient programs.  
There are only 43 public residential centers where people can be 
interned.150  Private residential facilities with standardized quality 
care can cost anywhere between 3,500 to 16,000 USD for a forty-five-
day treatment,151 a price outside the reach of most of Mexico’s 
population.  People with insufficient economic resources, living in 
areas of extreme poverty and scarcity of public services, go to what 
are known as anexos or granjas (51.1 percent of men and 22.9 percent 
of women who reported accessing treatment). 152  These are low-cost 
private centers, mostly operating outside the law, with no official 
supervision.153  Government data estimates that there are 
approximately 2,300 residential rehabilitation centers, of which only 
16 percent are registered with health authorities and only 12 percent 
 
who use drugs and 12.8 percent of women with drug dependence to respective 9.3 
percent and 22.1 percent of men).  The study also mentions that women mainly go 
to individual non-group therapies, which could be due to stigma and harassment. 
 149 According to the ENCODAT, supra note 137, of those who actually did 
want to go to treatment, the top reasons for not getting help include the following: 
do not know where to go (11.7 percent), do not want to be committed against their 
will (10.6 percent), thought that the treatment would not help (9.8 percent), do not 
have enough economic resources (9.6 percent), thought it would take too long (8.8 
percent), treatment centers are far from their residence (8.5 percent), did not go 
because of shame (8.2 percent), were not satisfied with the services available (7.5 
percent) were concerned about what people would think (7.0 percent) and couldn’t 
go because medical insurance does not cover it (6.0 percent). 
 150 See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 151 See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 152 See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 153 For a more detailed description of annexes and where they are found, see 
ENCODAT, supra note 137, and Brian Anderson et al., Regulación repensada: la 
necesidad de nuevas políticas y normas en el tratamiento de las adicciones [Regulation 
rethought: the need for new policies and regulations in the treatment of addictions], in LAS 
VIOLENCIAS: EN BUSCA DE LA POLÍTICA PÚBLICA DETRÁS DE LA GUERRA CONTRA LAS 
DROGAS [VIOLENCES: IN SEARCH OF PUBLIC POLICY BEHIND THE WAR ON DRUGS] (Laura 
Atuesta & Alejandro Madrazo eds., CIDE 2018). 
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comply with government regulation.154  Some states in the country, 
like Oaxaca, have only one registered center for the entire state.155 
There is no regular or systematic monitoring of practices in 
anexos and granjas, but conditions are consistently reported as 
troubling and treatment as not based on medical or scientific 
principles.  According to Mexican law, enrollment in treatment 
centers must be “strictly voluntary.” 156  However, studies and 
human rights reports based on patient interviews, disclose 
involuntary retention, often in violent conditions. 157   Interviewees 
describe physical abuse, including punishments for minor 
infractions (not sitting up straight or not paying attention), which 
include kneeling on metal bottle caps for hours, sitting on cactuses 
or a jagged brick, isolation rooms, being struck with sticks, or going 
without food.  Many centers use emotional as well as physical 
humiliation, particularly in front of family members.  Interviewees 
also report poor hygienic conditions, overcrowding, and lack of 
medical services.  In some cases, there are reports that patients died 
by suicide due to desperation. Interviewees mention lack of trust in 
the treatment system and fear that they will be put through similar 
 
 154 At the national level, from 2006 to 2012, the National Center for the 
Prevention and Control of Addictions (CENADIC), through the National Census of 
Establishments Specialized in the Treatment of Addictions, reported the existence 
of 560 outpatient facilities and 1736 residential establishments (including anexos and 
granjas, as well as private institutions), which deal with drug use.  According to 
recent data from CONADIC, as of April 2018, only 340 “Specialized Establishments 
in the Treatment of Addictions in Residential Modality” were registered by the 
government.  These 340 include the forty-three public centers. 
 155 Other studies have much higher numbers, with public health officials 
estimating that there are between 1,000–4,000 annexes in Mexico City alone.  
Because most centers are not registered, the information that is available about the 
annexes comes mainly from unofficial sources, such as newspapers and the radio.  
See Blanca Valadez, Retiros de alcohólicos, cárceles de terror [Withdrawals of alcoholics, 
prisons of terror], MILENIO, 2008, http://www.milenio.com/node/134891; Arlett 
Mendoza, Dañan a adictos centros piratas [Damage to addicted pirate centers], REFORMA 
2010, https://webmaster316.wordpress.com/2010/02/17/retiros-de-alcoholicos-
carceles-de-terror/ [https://perma.cc/QLH4-BNN3]. 
 156 Norma Oficial Mexicana, [Official Mexican Standard], NOM-028-SSA2-
1999, Para la prevención, tratamiento y control de las adicciones, [For the 
prevention, treatment, and control of addictions], Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF] 12-04- 2000 (Mex.), 
http://www.salud.gob.mx/unidades/cdi/nom/028ssa29.html 
[https://perma.cc/6DE6-9J88]. 
 157 See OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS, NI SOCORRO, NI SALUD: ABUSOS EN VEZ DE 
REHABILITACIÓN PARA USUARIOS DE DROGA EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, [NO 
HEALTH, NO HELP: ABUSE AS DRUG REHABILITATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN], 2016.  See also Anderson et al., supra note 153. 
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conditions as reasons for not seeking treatment again.  Additionally, 
people who work in these centers are not properly trained to 
diagnose or treat the symptoms.158  Patients often relapse for lack of 
proper treatment.159 
Drug courts were created in Mexico as an alternative to 
incarceration, alleging a shift towards a health perspective in drug 
policy.  In 2009, the first drug court was created in the state of Nuevo 
Leon.160  By 2013, the government decided to expand the program 
throughout the country.  Since then, five more states—Morelos, the 
State of Mexico, Chihuahua, Durango, and Chiapas—have 
established drug courts, while Mexico City and Baja California are 
also considering their implementation.161 
Drug courts are not specialized tribunals, but rather special 
procedures within ordinary criminal courts.  If a person is eligible 
for the program, prosecution is suspended for as long as that person 
complies with it.  Failure to complete the program results in the 
reactivation of prosecution. This means treatment operates within 
the criminal justice system, not through health service providers.  As 
stated by a recent report by the Social Science Research Council, 
Defendants remain in criminal proceedings at every step in 
the drug court program, risk incarceration both as a sanction 
while in the program and for failure to complete it, and, in 
some cases, spend more time behind bars than they would 
 
 158 The substance abuse that people are treated for in these centers differs from 
study to study, with alcohol being consistently the most common (39.3 percent), 
followed by methamphetamines (22.9 percent), marijuana (14.3 percent), cocaine 
(9.4 percent), inhalants (5.5 percent) and heroin (3.4 percent).  In the government’s 
youth-centered institutions, Youth Integration Centers (CIJ), the two drugs most 
frequently reported were marijuana (41.1 percent) and methamphetamine (16.1 
percent).  It is important to point out that methamphetamine does not appear as 
widely-used (with less than 0.2 percent) in the national survey, yet it is a drug that 
is often visible at treatment centers.  See ENCODAT, supra note 137. 
 159 COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS DE SAN LUIS POTOSÍ [STATE 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN SAN LUIS POTOSÍ] (CEDHSLP), INFORME ESPECIAL: 
SOBRE CENTROS DE TRATAMIENTO DE ADICCIONES EN MODALIDAD RESIDENCIAL, 
[SPECIAL REPORT: ON ADDICTION TREATMENT CENTERS IN RESIDENTIAL MODALITY], 
2011. 
 160 Tania T. Ramírez, Cortes de drogas en México: persiguiendo a los consumidores 
[Drug Courts in Mexico: Persecuting Consumers], NEXOS (June 25, 2015), 
https://eljuegodelacorte.nexos.com.mx/?p=4743 [https://perma.cc/Z2DJ-A7BR]. 
 161 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, DRUG COURTS IN THE AMERICAS: A 
REPORT BY THE DRUGS, SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAM 50 (2018). 
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have had they chosen to pursue criminal justice proceedings 
instead of drug court.162 
Initial data regarding the functioning of drug courts shows that 
in most cases the program is used for young men accused of simple 
possession of cannabis.163  The exception was the state of Nuevo 
Leon where the program is used mostly to treat alcohol abuse and 
family violence.  Since 2016, the Mexican government took steps to 
replace the original drug treatment model with the “Model of 
Therapeutic Justice Program for People with Psychoactive 
Substance Use”.  This new model, still based on the drug court 
model, seeks to standardize the criteria by which they operate.164  
However, as before, it keeps all drug offences within the sphere of 
the criminal justice system. 
Other vulnerable populations 
Drug policy based on prohibition does not affect everyone 
equally.  Certain groups, such as women, young men from poor 
suburban areas, and farmers, have been disproportionally affected 
by prohibition. 
In the case of women, several studies show that, although the 
majority of the incarcerated people in Latin America (including 
Mexico) are men, the number of women in prisons is growing.  The 
majority of these women are incarcerated for drug-related crimes,165 
come from poor backgrounds and, in some countries, are 
predominantly black.166  Many women get involved in the drug 
trade due to economic difficulties, but the penal response further 
 
 162 Id. at 2. 
 163 Ramírez, supra note 160. 
 164 SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 161, at 51. 
 165 Wola et al., MUJERES, POLÍTICAS DE DROGAS Y ENCARCELAMIENTO, UNA GUÍA 
PARA LAS REFORMAS DE POLÍTICAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE, 2016. [WOMEN, 
DRUG POLICIES, AND INCARCERATION, A GUIDE TO POLICY REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN], 2016, 
https://www.oas.org/es/cim/docs/womendrugsincarceration-es.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6U35-LHRN].  See also Gretchen Cloutier, Latin America’s Female 
Prisoner Problem: How the War on Drugs, Feminization of Poverty, and Female Liberation 
Contribute to Mass Incarceration of Women, 7(1) CLOCKS & CLOUDS (2016). 
 166 Jodie Michelle Lawston, Women, the Criminal Justice System, and 
Incarceration: Processes of Power, Silence and Resistance, 20 FEM. FORM. (2008). 
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aggravates these problems.  Due to their incarceration, their 
dependents are further exposed to risk and vulnerability.167 
Most of the women processed and sanctioned for drug crimes 
are non-violent offenders, processed for micro-trafficking or 
possession of illicit substances.168  They often enter the drug trade as 
low-level mules, but have little chance of upward mobility in terms 
of economic earning and decision-making power.169  Furthermore, 
in several Latin American countries, like Mexico, transportation of 
drugs is more severely punished than other drug crimes.  This 
means that, when women are detained for carrying substances from 
one point to another, they often receive extremely harsh 
punishments.170 
Studies also show that prohibition has caused thousands of 
adolescents to be prosecuted and incarcerated, shattering their life 
projects.171  Enforcement of current drug laws puts these young men 
and women through a criminal justice system that not only 
stigmatizes them for life but also impairs their right to health.172  As 
described earlier, prison conditions in Mexico are precarious. 
Prisoners live in overcrowded cells, lacking water, food, medicine 
and general services.173  Youth centers share many of the problems 
of adult prisons in the country.  Through their exposure to this 
system, these young men and women are exposed to violence, drug 
abuse, and discrimination.  Like women, however, their 
participation in the drug market is often trivial and when arrested, 
they are easily replaced with other minors.174 
The criminalization of these social groups often has devastating 
effects on their families and communities but makes little difference 
in the illegal market.  The use of prison represents a burden to 
families and often worsens the situation that pushed them into 
entering the illegal market.  As stated by the Washington Office on 
 
 167 CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 110. 
 168 Lawston, supra note 166. 
 169 Cloutier, supra note 165. 
 170 CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 110. 
 171  CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 120. 
 172  CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 120. 
 173  CHAPARRO & PÉREZ CORREA, supra note 129, at 33–34. 
 174 ROSE MARIE ACHÁ, JÓVENES Y ADOLESCENTES PRIVADOS DE LIBERTAD POR 
DROGAS EN AMÉRICA LATINA [YOUTH DEPRIVED OF LIBERTY BY DRUGS IN LATIN 
AMERICA] (Colectivo de Estudios de Drogas y Derecho, 2015), 
http://www.drogasyderecho.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Rose_v07.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZHB3-KFN3]. 
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Latin America (WOLA) report “Women, Drug Policy and 
Incarceration”, women accused of drug crimes 
[ . . . ] rarely pose a threat to society.  Most are arrested for 
low-level yet high-risk tasks (small-scale drug dealing or 
transporting drugs); they become involved as a result of 
poverty, or at times due to coercion by a partner or relative.  
Their incarceration contributes little if anything to 
dismantling illegal drug markets or improving public 
security.  To the contrary, prison tends to worsen the 
situation, further limiting their chances of finding decent and 
legal employment when released from prison, thus 
perpetuating a vicious cycle of poverty, involvement in drug 
markets, and incarceration.175  
Farming communities dedicated to growing poppy and 
marijuana are usually located in very poor rural regions of the 
country.176  They often plant illicit crops as the only means of 
obtaining an income.177  Eradication of these crops is commonly 
done with the use of dangerous pesticides that pollute water 
sources, animals, and sometimes even legal crops, leaving 
communities without food sources.  These chemicals present a risk 
to the health of farmers and their communities.  In the case of 
marijuana, the chemical Paraquat is often used in Mexico to 
eradicate illicit crops.178  Paraquat is a chemical used to control grass, 
however, it is highly toxic and may lead to poisoning.179  If ingested 
in large amounts, it will likely lead to pain and swelling of the mouth 
and throat and gastrointestinal (digestive tract) symptoms, such as 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, and diarrhea (which may 
become bloody).180  Ingestion of small to medium amounts of 
Paraquat can lead to other issues such as liver failure, kidney failure, 
heart failure and lung scarring.181 
According to COFEPRIS (Comisión Federal para la Protección 
Contra Riesgos Sanitarios), the Mexican FDA, Paraquat can remain 
 
 175 Wola et al., supra note 165. 
 176 Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9. 
 177 Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9, at 41. 
 178 Pérez Correa & Ruiz, supra note 9, at 37–38. 
 179 Paraquat, CENTER FOR DISASTER CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/paraquat/basics/facts.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9N2Q-PQQU]. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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in the ground for up to three years182, which raises serious concerns 
regarding the potential risk to communities where it is used by the 
government to eradicate illicit marijuana crops. In addition to 
Paraquat, Glyphosate is used in Mexico to eradicate both marijuana 
and poppy plantations.  In Colombia, given the potential risk to the 
health of farming communities, the Constitutional Court ruled 
against the aerial aspersion of Glyphosate to eradicate poppy 
plantations.183  In 2017, the court ordered the discontinuation of the 
aerial aspersion of Glyphosate in all territories arguing that “when 
a reasonable doubt exists regarding the possible damage to the 
environment or to the health of people [ . . . ] all measures should be 
taken to avoid any damage.”184 
The logic justifying the use of these chemicals in Mexico—for the 
destruction of illicit crops to protect health—highly contrasts with 
the harms caused by the policy.  Put together with other costs 
generated by prohibition and shown above, the transformation of 
drug policy in Mexico becomes a necessity. 
4. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MEXICO’S DRUG POLICY 
In this section, we outline five guiding principles that, in our 
view, should inform Mexico’s drug policy.  In addition, as a sixth 
point, we address the constraints to domestic regulation that stem 
from international treaties that govern prohibition. 
Principles can better guide policy interventions when they are 
formulated with clear objectives in mind.  Therefore, identifying the 
public problems that need to be addressed by policy is crucial.  
There are two types of problems that a comprehensive and 
evidence-based drug policy needs to address in Mexico: (i) problems 
that have resulted from the drug policy currently in place, and (ii) 
problems stem from unmanaged drug use. 
 
 182 Paraquat: datos de identificación [Paraquat: identification data], Institutio 
Nacional de Ecología y Cambio Climático [National Institute of Ecology and 
Climate Change] (INECC), 
http://www2.inecc.gob.mx/sistemas/plaguicidas/pdf/paraquat.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TD5K-CNAR]. 
 183 Corte Constitucional [Constitutional Court] [C.C.], febrero 7, 2017, 
Sentencia T-080/17 (Colomb.), 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2017/t-080-17.htm 
[https://perma.cc/VQU6-USXN]. 
 184 Id. 
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In Mexico, drug policy reform should aim, first and urgently, to 
address the problems that drug policy itself produces: violence, 
systematic violations of human rights, population displacement and 
criminalization of people who use drugs.  Secondly, it should also 
prevent and address harms to health stemming from problematic 
drug use. 
With these objectives in mind, the guiding principles that inform 
the recommendations that will be offered in the last section are the 
following: 
 
a. The right to health185 
 
Prohibition, as applied today, should be considered 
unconstitutional simply because it violates the right to health.  
Legislative history186 and Supreme Court precedents establish that 
substance regulation is one of the ways through which the State 
must protect the right to health, as determined in Article 4 of the 
Constitution.187  In key tobacco control cases, the Supreme Court has 
upheld substance regulation on the grounds that proper regulation, 
in relation to substances potentially damaging to health, is 
grounded in the right to health and a means of fulfilling state 
obligations in relation to it.  Moreover, the Court found that the 
regulation most protective of health prevails over that which is less 
protective.188  Furthermore, the Court has found that adequate 
regulation of a substance—that is, regulation that is effective in 
 
 185 In the end, the negation of the right to health transits into a negation of the 
right to life. We focus here on health as the broader category.  Whereas the violation 
of right to life is a violation of a right in itself, it can also be conceived as an extreme 
in a range of affectations to the right to health.  Moreover, whereas the right to life 
can only be negated at an individual level, the epidemic proportions of homicides 
have a secondary impact on public health, as the decrease in life expectancy in 
Mexico under the war on drugs illustrates.  Thus, we choose to use the right to 
health as a broader category that allows us to see the public health impact of the 
epidemic rise in homicides.  It should be understood, however, that the extreme 
affectation of health that is the loss of life can also be framed and understood, at an 
individual level, as the negation of the right to life.  See Madrazo & Alonso, supra 
note 46. 
 186 See CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 1 (referring to the 1983 constitutional 
amendment introducing the health as a constitutional right). 
 187 CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 4. 
 188 See, e.g., Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 119/2008, Pleno de la SCJN, 
Novena Época, 3 de septiembre de 2009 (Mex.), 
www2.scjn.gob.mx/juridica/engroses/3/2008/19/3_103860_0.doc 
[https://perma.cc/2AG9-CNXS] (supporting that the most protective regulation of 
health prevails over that which is less protective). 
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protecting health—is something that individuals can judicially 
demand from the State.189  Specifically, it has found that citizens can 
challenge legislation that purportedly seeks to protect human health 
but in reality ends up effectively harming or risking the health of 
individuals.190 
Fundamental rights imply an obligation on the State to refrain 
from impinging upon them (a negative obligation), but also—
according to Article 1 of the Constitution—imply further obligations 
to procure a context that is conducive to the enjoyment of those rights 
(positive obligations).  Among the positive obligations of the State 
that stem from all fundamental rights is the obligation to protect 
people from impingement of that right by third parties (i.e., private 
actors).  Also, on occasion, there may exist an obligation of the State 
to directly provide goods and services necessary for the enjoyment 
of that right by the State itself.191  For instance, providing public 
education or basic health services, such as vaccination campaigns, 
would fall under this type of obligation.  In other words, every 
fundamental right may engender different types of obligation for 
the State, not just the (negative) obligation of refraining from 
impinging upon a fundamental right. 
Since 2011, Article 1 of the Constitution explicitly recognizes 
four such types of obligations: (i) to promote conditions enabling 
their enjoyment; (ii) to respect, through non-interference, a person’s 
enjoyment of a right; (iii) to protect from impingement on that right 
by third parties; and (iv) to guarantee, in some cases, the direct 
provision of goods and services needed for the exercise of that right.  
The government thus has obligations to respect the right to health, 
i.e., refrain from directly engaging in situations which unnecessarily 
 
 189 See, e.g., Amparo en Revisión [Petition for Constitutional Relief] 315/2010, 
Pleno de la SCJN, 28 de marzo de 2011 (Mex.), 
https://www.globalhealthrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/Balderas_Woolrich_v._Mexico-Mexico-20111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F64Q-JZ4P] (supporting that the regulation of a substance 
protecting health can be judicially demanded from the State). 
 190 Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 119/2008, supra note 188; Amparo en 
Revisión 315/2010, supra note 189. 
 191 See CPEUM, supra note 40, at art. 1 (“Todas las autoridades, en el ámbito 
de sus competencias, tienen la obligación de promover, respetar, proteger y 
garantizar los derechos humanos de conformidad con los principios de 
universalidad, interdependencia, indivisibilidad y progresividad”; “All authorities, 
within the scope of their powers, have the obligation to promote, respect, protect 
and guarantee human rights in accordance with the principles of universality, 
interdependence, indivisibility and progressivity.”).  For an analysis of this article 
specifically focusing on the right to health, see Madrazo & Alonso, supra note 46. 
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threaten the health of the population; to protect the right to health by 
keeping third parties from harming the health of individuals; to 
provide key services, such as treatment for and prevention of abuse; 
and to promote health, by providing a context in which people can 
protect their own health effectively. 
Prohibition fails to comply with all four types of obligations and 
should thus be deemed unconstitutional on the grounds of the right 
to health.  Even if it failed to comply with only one of these 
obligations, without procuring effective protection to some aspect of 
health, that is tangible and documented, it should be considered 
unconstitutional.   
In the following lines, we flesh out how prohibition in Mexico 
violates the right to health by looking at the four types of obligations 
that the State has in reference to the population’s health.  The 
following paragraphs are illustrative and should not be understood 
to be the only actual—or potential—negative impacts on (the right 
to) health that prohibition has engendered. 
First, Mexico, by enforcing prohibition, fails to promote the right 
to health by creating a situation in which health (and life) become 
far more vulnerable.  Enforcement policies in Mexico have 
propagated the epidemic of homicides.  A result of this epidemic, as 
mentioned above, is a fall in average life expectancy in Mexico.  This 
means that there are good reasons to believe that prohibition 
negatively affects the general health conditions of Mexicans to a 
degree that it affects even the broadest indicators of health of a 
population: average life expectancy.  Also, Mexico’s government 
fails to promote health when its prohibitionist discourse crowds out 
harm reduction efforts to communicate vital information for safe 
use. 
Second, through its enforcement of prohibition, Mexico fails to 
respect the right to health.  Users are exposed to an unclear and 
uncertain legal system that makes them targets of the criminal 
justice system rather than being offered information or services to 
take care of their health.  Also, it fails in this type of obligation by 
widely tolerating—or, according to some reports, promoting192— 
the unnecessary use of lethal force or the use of torture by 
 
 192 See Cadena de Mando [translated in Chain of Command], PERIODISTAS DE A PIE, 
http://cadenademando.org/ [https://perma.cc/DU5J-K4EB]; Ana Langner, La 
orden a los militares fue abatir a los delincuentes [The order to the military was to kill the 
criminals], EL ECONOMISTA (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/%20La-orden-a-los-militares-fue-
abatir-a-los-delincuentes-20150702-0085.html [https://perma.cc/7BCK-QCV3]. 
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authorities.  That is, through its unchecked use of torture and lethal 
force, the Mexican government fails to fulfill its obligation to respect 
the right to health of the individuals who are presumed to have 
committed criminal acts. 
Third, under prohibition, Mexico fails to protect the health of 
users from third parties who provide unsafe substances in the black 
markets and unsafe treatment facilities that informally operate 
throughout the country. 
Finally, under prohibition and with a public treatment service 
focused exclusively on abstention, Mexico fails to provide necessary 
health services—specifically, treatment options—for people who 
would benefit from assisted treatment and/or substitution 
treatment. 
For these reasons, we hold that the State is under the obligation 
to provide health services—such as safe and voluntary treatment for 
problematic use—as well as a regulatory framework that allows 
people who use drugs to have informed and safe access to drugs 
they choose to use. 
The right to health also implies an obligation to refrain from 
adopting policies that create serious harm to health for both people 
who use drugs and the general population.  We have presented, in 
the previous sections of this paper, a considerable amount of 
evidence that points to this problem.  Prohibition enforcement has 
been a key driver in the homicide epidemic, affecting the general 
population—not only people the State claims were committing drug 
crimes or drug users.  Prohibition harms the health of people who 
use drugs and who commit drug crimes and are imprisoned for 
doing so.  Prohibition also affects their families’ health.  Many 
people are harmed by prohibition, and there are no documented 
benefits to the health of users, or anyone else, stemming from 
prohibition. 
Damages and risks related to drugs are of two types: the 
primary, related to the use, and the secondary, related to the illicit 
nature of the drug market.  In Mexico, the secondary risks and harms 
clearly outweigh the primary.  The harms to health resulting from 
violence significantly surpass those caused by the direct use of 
illegal drugs, especially when more stringent measures are adopted 
to enforce prohibition.  In other words, grounding drug policy in the 
right to health calls for the adoption of a robust understanding of 
harm reduction, which includes not only minimizing the negative 
health impact of drug use, but—more urgently—minimizing the 
negative health impact of the current drug policy.  The data 
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summarized in this text suggests that separating a third type of 
damage and risk to health related to drugs may be in order, at least 
in Mexico: the risks and damages resulting directly from enforcing 
prohibition. 
 
b. The right to freely develop one’s personality 
 
In principle, drug use is permitted by the Mexican 
Constitution.193  By implication, the Mexican Constitution permits 
the production of drugs.  Mexico’s Supreme Court found that the 
fundamental right to the free development of an individual’s 
personality protects an individual’s choice to use marijuana. 194  
Accordingly, it has found that a blanket ban—as exists today—on 
actions such as possession, cultivation, and access to this substance 
is incompatible with Mexico’s Constitution.  The protection of such 
an individual choice—with all its implications regarding safe access 
to drugs—must, therefore, be a core principle guiding drug policy.  
As regulation substitutes for prohibition, safe access to drugs and 
the conditions to make an informed choice regarding use must be 
factored into policy design. 
 
c. Policies tailored to and by local communities 
 
Prohibition is the wrong approach to drug policy, because it is a 
one-size-fits-all solution to a phenomenon that is both complex and 
highly context-dependent.  Regulation should leave room for the 
tailoring of interventions to the needs of each community, but also 
and importantly, for community involvement in defining those 
needs and interventions.195  Much of the violence documented 
throughout Mexico relates to the undermining of local governments’ 
 
 193 The Court opinions speak exclusively to cannabis, but arguably the 
substantive arguments that constitute their ratio hold equally for other substances. 
While the Constitution may admit more restrictive specific policy designs for other 
drugs, the core finding—that an absolute ban on use overreaches margins of 
legislative regulatory powers—in principle holds for all drugs. 
 194 Amparo indirecto 237/2014, supra note 79; Amparo Indirecto 637/2017, 
supra note 84; Amparo Indirecto 1163/2017, supra note 84; Amparo Indirecto 
1115/2017, supra note 84. 
 195 This of course, should always be within a human rights framework and the 
protection of personal freedom. 
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institutional capacities.196  Restoring community trust and social 
reparations to populations affected by the violence stemming from 
prohibition must be the focus of locally tailored interventions. 
 
d. Effective access to information, medication and treatment 
 
Making evidence-based information available regarding the 
risks and dangers of drug use is one of the State’s obligations in 
protecting the right to health.  As to treatment, the State has the 
obligation to offer prevention and rehabilitation services.  These 
services should be voluntary, free, secular, and universally 
accessible based on health and human rights.  Any model that is 
used to comply with this obligation must be tailored to reduce risks 
and harms. 
 
e. Diversification and evidence-based revision of the laws 
 
Prohibition has inhibited the exploration of less harmful and 
more effective policies.  A swift shift away from violently enforced 
prohibition and militarization should include strict independent 
monitoring and evaluation of results of new different interventions.   
Systematic monitoring and evaluation of results must be essential 
components of a drug policy comprising regulation. 
 
f. Respect for human rights and a note on international law 
 
Much has been written regarding the weight of constraints to 
domestic regulation that stem from international treaties that govern 
prohibition.  The debate is ample and complex, but the basic 
positions on the matter are clearly and succinctly set forth in the 
Global Commission’s 2018 Report on Regulation: The Responsible 
Control of Drugs.197 
We affirm, confidently, that regulation is a constitutional 
obligation in Mexico notwithstanding the country’s condition as 
signatory of the prohibitionist UN Conventions. 
Mexico’s drug policy must be grounded, first and foremost, on 
human rights.  As explained above, Mexico has a peculiar position 
 
 196 See, e.g., Meza, supra note 52; Escalante, supra note 92; and Catalina Pérez 
Correa & Carlos De la Rosa, (In)Security and Self-Government: Lessons from the 
Mexican Experience, ICL J. (forthcoming). 
 197 Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13. 
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in this respect, for its Supreme Court has repeatedly held that drug 
use falls within the constitutional protection of the right to freely 
develop one’s personality.  Moreover, Mexico’s generous right to 
health doctrine provides solid grounding for harm reducing 
regulatory models regarding drugs.  Because of this, it makes sense 
to ponder the weight of the international drug regulation regime in 
light of the international human rights regime, for the latter is 
inextricably tied to Mexico’s robust human rights domestic law.  
Reputable legal scholars have put forward a clear and compelling 
case that according to “a systematic and comprehensive 
interpretation of international law, the human rights system has 
legal primacy over the international drug control regime.”198 
These authors recognize that international human rights law and 
international drug policy regulation have evolved independently 
and, consequently, come into tension as the international drug 
policy regime directly and indirectly violates human rights.  
Directly, for instance, because prohibition implies measures such as 
denying access to essential medicines, establishing disproportionate 
punishments, or disregarding traditional uses of coca for minority 
cultures.  Indirectly, because empirical evidence shows that 
prohibition enforcement exacerbates phenomena such as violence, 
human rights violations, displacements, disappearances, and 
torture.  Undoubtedly, as we lay out in this paper, this is the case for 
Mexico. 
When the two international law systems clash, international 
human rights law should prevail.  The UN’s human rights norms 
prevail over drug conventions, for the former derive directly from 
the UN Charter itself, whereas international obligations regarding 
drug prohibition are “not an expression of the state obligations 
under the charter.”199  Moreover, one of the fundamental purposes 
of the UN is the promotion and protection of human rights; this is 
not so for drug prohibition.  Furthermore, many of the human rights 
norms are considered jus cogens (the highest level in the hierarchy of 
norms in international law); in fact, they correctly point out, most 
jus cogens norms are human rights norms.  Finally, the General 
Assembly of the United Nations has declared that the international 
 
 198 Rodrigo Uprimny & Diana Esther Guzmán, Drug Policies and Human Rights 
(forthcoming) (on file with authors). 
 199 Id. 
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drug regulation regime must respect the UN Charter in general and 
human rights in particular.200 
As this paper shows, prohibition in Mexico has led to the gravest 
human rights crisis in decades, while drug regulation as here 
proposed is grounded in domestically and internationally 
recognized human rights.  The choice, we believe, is clear.  
Regulation is a constitutional obligation. 
5. FROM PROHIBITION TO REGULATION 
This section sets out concrete regulatory and policy proposals for 
the most important drug markets that are currently illegal.  We draw 
from international experiences, but offer regulatory models and 
policies tailored to Mexico’s specific needs, weaknesses, and 
strengths.  Admittedly, the proposals are not fully developed here, 
but simply sketched.  Although prevention, information, and 
treatment for those who need it are not mentioned in every 
regulatory proposal, we consider them an essential part of any 
model. 
We begin by presenting two measures that we believe should be 
adopted immediately, regardless of how far and how quickly 
Mexico’s government is willing and capable to move towards 
regulation of all substances.  A third section contains concrete 
proposals for regulating access to some drugs, with each substance 
discussed separately. 
Release of non-violent prisoners 
Draconian prohibition has frequently entailed the 
criminalization of people who use drugs, and, therefore, has had a 
discriminatory and disparate impact on the poorest participants in 
today’s illegal market.  This is, for example, the case for most women 
and farmers detained for drug crimes.  Because of this, an aggressive 
program of case revisions in which non-violent drug offenders can 
obtain their release from prison should be put in place 
 
 200 See G.A. Res. 63/197, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 2008); G.A. Res. 62/176, ¶ 1 (Dec. 18, 
2007). 
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immediately.201  There are several legal modalities for the 
implementation of such a program, ranging from early release to 
amnesty.  Whatever the choice of legal vehicle, what is most 
important is to rapidly alleviate one of the most harmful and 
continuing burdens that prohibition has placed on users and 
vulnerable communities: imprisonment. 
People who have been convicted for use or simple possession of 
any illegal drug should have their cases revised with the objective of 
securing their release and/or their sentences revoked.  Additionally, 
the government must implement measures that allow for a 
successful social and labor reintegration of those prisoners who 
benefit from the early release, pardon or amnesty.  The following 
measures are recommended: 
  Eliminate criminal records for those crimes and restore all 
active rights. 
  Design programs specifically tailored to help released drug 
prisoners in their reintegration into society.  Education and 
training consistent with their capabilities and compatible 
with the needs of the labor-market should be an essential 
part of those programs. 
  Provide incentives and other stimuli through which the 
populations disproportionately affected by prohibition can 
participate in the opportunities stemming from the emerging 
legal drug industries.  For instance, lowly farmers in regions 
where chemical eradication of crops has taken place and 
caused most harm should be given priority if they wish to 
become legal producers. 
  Implement non-discrimination measures to de-stigmatize 
drug users who have long been targeted by government 
campaigns in the context of prohibition. 
  Provide counseling, medical attention and voluntary 
treatment to those who require it. 
Additionally, Congress should revise the proportionality of all 
existing penalties for “crimes against health”, especially prison 
sentences.  In particular, the penalties for the crime of transporting 
drugs, which, as applied, disproportionately criminalizes women, 
should be revised.202  Alternative sanctions—excluding compulsory 
 
 201 This proposal should not be confused with the proposal for amnesty in 
Mexico, which is circumscribed in the idea of transitional justice. 
 202 Many women who are persecuted for crimes against health are detained 
because of drug transportation.  They are generally not dangerous to society and 
having them in prison presents high social costs, many times much greater than the 
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treatment—should be favored for non-violent crimes related to 
drugs. 
Decriminalization of use of all drugs 
Decriminalization of the use and possession for personal use of 
all illegal substances is recommended, including the 
decriminalization203 of possession of amounts needed for personal 
use, which are currently unrealistically low.  Importantly, 
thresholds should be based on user´s practices, and defined as a 
floor below which possession cannot be persecuted and above 
which intent to sell or distribute needs be proven in order to 
persecute.204  Prosecutors and judges should prove intent for illegal 
commerce in the case of possession and not simply punish 
individuals on charges of simple possession. 
Legal and regulated access to specific drugs 
Considering the harms resulting from the existing drug policy, 
we unequivocally recommend moving towards the establishment of 
legal and well-regulated systems that allow people who use drugs 
to access them in a safe and informed manner, beginning with 
cannabis but also moving promptly to regulate the supply of other 
currently illegal drugs.  Although prudence may suggest gradual, 
tiered changes in policy, we believe that regulating only one drug 
and leaving the people who use others in the hands of criminals and 
 
costs of the crime for which they are being accused.  The Federal Criminal Code 
currently establishes that penalties for the transport of drugs range from ten to 25 
years in prison.  This Federal Criminal Code also establishes that alternative 
measures can only be applied for crimes that do not surpass a penalty of four years 
of prison.  This means that most women are automatically taken out of the pool of 
people that can receive alternative measures.  Therefore, thinking about alternative 
measures must be done at the same time as a review of penalties.  See Rodrigo 
Meneses & Catalina Pérez Correa, Mujeres y drogas: Cómo sentencian los jueces 
federales a hombres y mujeres acusados de delitos contra la salud, in CATALINA PÉREZ 
CORREA, ET AL., DE LA DETENCIÓN A LA PRISIÓN: LA JUSTICIA PENAL A EXAMEN, (CIDE, 
2015). 
 203 Currently, possessing drugs within the tolerated amounts is not penalized 
but remains a crime. 
 204 Currently, thresholds function as a roof, above which possession is always 
persecuted. 
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the criminal justice system, means accepting unjustifiable social 
harms.  As argued before, only decriminalizing use and simple 
possession of drugs leaves us in a predicament close to the current 
crisis: both black markets and violent prohibition would continue to 
exist.  To avoid this, we propose a policy aiming to regulate the 
supply of all drugs. 
Importantly, the substance-specific policies set forth should be 
understood under the same logic identified as “the essence of the 
case for regulation” in the Global Commission’s 2018 Regulation 
report.205  There, the Global Commission subscribes the idea that full 
prohibition and a fully free market are functional equivalents: both 
represent a substantially unregulated market, maximizing the 
potential risks and harms that derive from the operation of any 
market trading in psychoactive substances.206 
 
Graph 3: Different Drugs Different Degrees of Regulation207 
 
 205 Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13, at 12. 
 206 Id. 
 207 See Regulation: The Responsible Control of Drugs, supra note 13, supra note 13, 
figure 1 at 12. 
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If the extremes of the curve in the regulatory model in Graph 3 
are functionally equivalent, and minimal risks and harms are to be 
found at the lowest point in the curve, then the relevant question is 
which type of regulation brings us to that lowest point.  
Unavoidably, the answer is both context and substance specific.  
Different communities may reach the lowest point in the curve with 
different regulatory models; the same is true for every substance.  
There is no one-size-fits all solution.  Furthermore, we cannot be 
sure how a specific regulation will play out in a given community 
until it is actually in place and properly measured.  Accordingly, 
regulatory models should be brought under revision periodically, 
provided that there is good information and a rigorous 
methodology to make a reliable assessment. 
The proposed regulation models, therefore, should be 
understood as entry points into regulation and away from 
prohibition, and they should be always susceptible to revision.  
Because prohibition has been the rule and not the exception for a 
long time, there is a scarcity of experiences to draw from.  Some 
substances—such as cannabis—offer a broader spectrum of 
previous and ongoing experiences than others—such as cocaine.  
Accordingly, for the case of cannabis, we lay out more than one 
possible entry point into regulation.  In other cases, such as cocaine, 
we offer one possible entry point which we believe could guide the 
experimentation of policy in the case of Mexico.  All proposals here 
contained are compatible with and informed by the general 
recommendations for regulation set forth by the Global Commission 
2018 Report on Regulation. 
 
1. Cannabis 
 
The first substance that should be regulated is cannabis. The 
Supreme Court, following legal procedure, has notified Congress 
that a blanket prohibition on cannabis has been repeatedly held to 
be unconstitutional.208  Regulating access to cannabis is not only a 
policy imperative but required by the Constitution and therefore 
necessary in order to abide by the rule of law. 
There are different models that can be used for regulating 
cannabis, ranging from the alcohol-style commercial model, 
 
 208 Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación, Declaratoria de 
Inconstitucionalidad 1/2018, 
http://www2.scjn.gob.mx/denunciasincumplimiento/ConsultaGenerales.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/U9NP-8744].  
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currently in place in some US states such as Colorado and 
Washington, to a state monopoly, as in Uruguay.  We explore three 
different models in this section and try to identify their relative 
strengths and weaknesses.  Irrespective of the model chosen, public 
health should be accorded the highest priority by the government.  
Regulation should therefore seek to: 
  Reduce harms caused by the illicit market (harms such as 
violence and proliferation of organized crime); 
  Reduce harms to individual health from heavy/problematic 
use; 
  Reduce youth use; 
  Prevent harms from contaminants and additives, and 
provide for quality assurance and consumer information; 
  Reduce harms to others from harmful use of cannabis 
(impairment/intoxication, exposure to second-hand smoke); 
  Minimize the risk of corporate—or any other special 
interest—capture of regulation; and 
  Make efforts to include in the new legal markets those 
communities and populations most affected under 
prohibition, such as growers, dealers from the poorest 
communities, and internally displaced communities. 
Additionally, the following measures—drawn from 
international legal standards for substance regulation—should be 
adopted, independently of the model chosen: 
(i) Packaging and labeling: use childproof packaging, clear and 
explicit health warnings, content labeling (potency and 
ingredients), and plain packaging. 
(ii) Advertising, promotion and sponsorship: prohibit all 
publicity, promotion, and sponsorship of cannabis products. 
This is in line with the international best practices in tobacco 
control. 
(iii) Taxes: establish a tax system that keeps the price sufficiently 
low so that consumers do not return to the black market, but 
high enough to discourage use at the margin.  Taxes and 
other fiscal revenues from this activity should be, at least 
partially, earmarked for three areas: a) prevention and 
treatment programs especially targeted at youth prevention; 
b) economic development, education, and job placement for 
communities most affected by prohibition; and c) medical 
cannabis research.  We propose earmarking for reasons of 
political economy, although we concur that it is not an 
impeccably sound fiscal practice. 
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(iv) Regulate modalities of use: implement tobacco control 
efforts, such as the establishment of smoke-free zones. 
Employ alcohol control measures, such as a ban on driving 
under the influence. 
(v) Product regulation: regulate the type of products (edibles, 
lotions, concentrates), permitted ingredients (prohibit any 
product mixed with nicotine or other, more addictive 
substances, for example), and potency levels. 
(vi) Regulate the distribution and sale: this includes the number 
and type of stores, locations where they can be established, 
restrictions of on-site use, minimum age for purchase, limits 
on sales and who can sell or grow for commercial purposes. 
The first five elements should be similar in any model.   
Differences between models should lie mainly in the structure of the 
industry: the regulation of production, distribution, and access so as 
to determine who can participate in the cultivation, production, and 
sale of cannabis, and how. 
Independently of the model chosen, regulation should always 
allow for two modalities of production and access: (I) Domestic 
cultivation for personal use of a limited number of plants per 
household at any time. (II) Cannabis clubs, conceived as non-profit 
civil associations, constituted with the purpose of guaranteeing for 
members the monthly supply of a determined amount of cannabis.   
It is an associative self-provisioning mechanism produced 
exclusively for its members, who pay a fixed fee to produce their 
cannabis in a regulated manner, with standards set by a specialized 
public body. 
These two modalities, by themselves, would not be sufficient to 
satisfy the existing demand, as most users are occasional and may 
decide not to participate in them.  Therefore, it is necessary to allow 
for the formation of a cannabis industry to supply most (occasional) 
users.  With this in mind, we sketch three possible models for 
establishing a legal cannabis industry.  They should be seen as three 
cases within a continuous range of possibilities. The three models 
offered here can also be seen as stages of a path through which 
regulation can transit.  Direction of transit, however, is not 
irrelevant: if the initial model is commercial, it will be difficult to 
move it to a more state-controlled model even if the experiment 
suggests the latter approach as the best.  Vested interests will 
quickly become entrenched as a private industry is set up. The other 
direction—from government control to commercial orientation—in 
principle would pose a lesser problem of entrenched vested interests 
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resisting the evolution of the model.  Yet it should be kept in mind 
that in Mexico, in the past resistance to transform state owned 
enterprises has been strongest from government insiders. 
 
a. A commercially oriented model 
 
Under this system, cultivation, production, distribution, and sale 
would be in the hands of the private market, subject of course to the 
pertinent laws and regulations, which should be enforced by a 
specialized government institution properly empowered—legally 
and financially.  The main advantage of this model would be to offer 
an array of products and prices that better satisfy demand at little 
cost to the State.  The main disadvantage of this model, specifically 
in the case of Mexico, is the potential creation of an industry whose 
primary concern is profit maximization, not public health.  Mexico 
has a history of substance regulation being obstructed or trumped 
by industry lobbying and should heed the warnings of past 
experiences.209  In choosing this model, strict limits on vertical 
integration are crucial.  Regulation should aim to keep the industry 
fragmented and compliant with very strict competition rules, so as 
to minimize the risk of capture of the regulator, as has happened 
before in Mexico with substances such as tobacco. 
Conceivably, this model is the least likely to be conducive to 
integrating vulnerable communities disproportionately affected by 
the war on drugs into the new legal markets.  Often marginalized 
and criminalized participants in today’s current illicit market, and 
the communities they come from, would probably not have the 
capacity to compete in a free market by themselves, at least initially.  
It is important to actively incorporate these vulnerable communities 
into the new legal market, so as to draw them away from the 
(smaller) illegal market that may subsist during transition from 
prohibition to regulation. 
 
b. Government monopoly 
 
A second possibility is a state monopoly.  Like in Uruguay, the 
government would be responsible for every step of the production 
 
 209 See Ángela Guerrero et al., Identificación de las estrategias de la industria 
tabacalera en México [Identification of the strategies of the tobacco industry in Mexico] 
(Legal Studies Department (DEJ) CIDE, Working Paper No. 51, 2010), 
http://www.libreriacide.com/librospdf/DTEJ-51.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U6P-
UCSV]. 
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chain, from seed to sale.  Under this model, the government could 
franchise producers to cultivate the drug, and then sell it through 
licensed pharmacies.  Still, there should be a separate and 
specialized government agency in charge of regulating the entire 
activity even if the latter is in the hands of the government itself. 
There are several arguments in favor of a government-run 
industry.  It could minimize diversion of drugs to the black market 
by giving the government close control over the product.  By 
removing profit-seeking from the core of the industry, the model 
allows the government’s commitment to public health to be 
paramount.  Practices which are used to promote sales, such as 
advertising, attractive packaging, and equivocal labeling, would be 
more easily avoided, and quality control could focus on health 
objectives rather than profit-maximization.  Importantly, a public, 
non-commercial model avoids one of the most problematic features 
of current legal drug industries like tobacco: the emergence of a few 
large private actors with the capacity and incentives to capture the 
regulator. 
A disadvantage of a government monopoly could be inefficiency 
and difficulty in adapting to shifts in demand.  If there is not enough 
production, or the product is not of good quality or high enough 
potency, some users could return to the black market.  Government 
monopolies are often inefficient. 
 
c. Mixed model 
 
This mixed model seeks to harness the benefits of the two 
previous models by establishing a government monopoly 
exclusively on wholesale while allowing for private production and 
retail distribution through franchises.  Retail sale at point-of-
production could be permitted for producers, but the bulk of the 
market would be served while avoiding vertical integration.  This 
model would allow for close government control of the substance 
itself and simultaneously facilitate the gathering of information 
about the market so as to document and assess success in achieving 
the public-health goals of regulation.   
Two government entities would need to be established, at least 
initially: a public enterprise that would hold the monopoly over 
wholesale; and as in the previous cases, a separate regulatory 
agency.  This bifurcation would also allow for later break-up and 
privatization of the wholesale monopoly once the regulating agency 
is deemed robust enough to enforce regulation without risk of 
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capture.  The regulating agency would license growers and approve 
franchise of retail points.  The public enterprise would buy the bulk 
of the production (excepting point-of-sale retail), test for quality 
control, package and label it and sell it to the licensed retailers.  The 
regulating agency would, among its other regulatory powers, 
establish limits for how much can be grown for each licensed grower 
or sold by retailers, and would enforce regulation such as limits on 
advertising linked to cannabis and sale to minors.  Through both the 
state-owned distribution company and the government regulatory 
agency, the state would maintain control and ensure that public 
health is the priority at each link in the production chain, while 
allowing for private participation in production and sale.  This is 
important for a country like Mexico that, unlike Uruguay, has a 
considerable number of citizens currently participating in illegal 
production and retail. If incorporation of this population into the 
legal economy is one of the driving objectives of regulation—and it 
should be—then this model has a considerable advantage over a 
state monopoly. 
The mixed model has all the benefits of a state monopoly, and 
additional ones: 
  By eliminating the profit-maximizing thrust of private 
intermediaries, the licit cannabis industry could quickly 
become competitive and displace the illicit market. 
  As all products must flow through one (public) entity, the 
cost of government inspection and monitoring could be 
considerably lower than in a purely commercial model.  A 
commercial model would purportedly require inspecting 
and monitoring a multiplicity of private actors.  This is 
particularly relevant for Mexico, as it does not currently have 
the institutional capacity to effectively monitor and inspect 
an open market with a large number of outlets, as tobacco 
control efforts have shown in the past. 
  Information gathering will be significantly eased through 
wholesale control.  This capacity will be crucial in the initial 
phases of setting up a regulated market.  Periodic revisions 
and adjustments of regulation will be crucial to ensure 
success of a transition away from prohibition. 
  For the specific case of Mexico, which has a much larger 
industry (production) and market (distribution) than 
Uruguay but relatively weaker regulatory institutions, than, 
for instance, Colorado or Canada, the mixed model allows 
for simultaneously maintaining control of information and 
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the market, while allowing the overwhelming majority of 
non-violent private individuals, who currently participate in 
the illicit industry, to move into a licit market. 
Communities currently most affected by prohibition—such as 
farmers and dealers from the poorest areas and those who have been 
internally displaced—should be the focus of targeted programs to 
ensure their incorporation into the newly established legal markets 
as a form of social reparation, no matter what model is chosen.  The 
mixed model could be most beneficial to these groups.  By allowing 
the government to work as the middle-man, it would be easier and 
probably less costly to have those from poorer communities 
participate in the market and also ensure a safer product. 
Farmers who are already growing cannabis should have the 
option to continue with the cultivation of such crops.  This would 
have two advantages: 1) it is an incentive to exit the illicit market, 
thus increasing the potential of the regulated market to displace the 
former; and 2) it provides producers already specialized in the 
production and distribution of marijuana, which would facilitate the 
rapid construction of a legal market (and consequent displacement 
of an illegal market).  Those convicted only of non-violent crimes 
against health and those who have not been convicted for selling to 
minors should still be able to participate in the market. 
 
2. Opioids 
 
Opioids should also be brought into a legal market, but under 
much stronger regulation than cannabis.  We recommend two 
parallel regulations, which are non-exclusive: (i) regulated poppy 
cultivation and private production of pharmaceuticals for medical 
use—both national and international—and (ii) a public monopoly 
for poppy cultivation and the production and distribution of opioids 
destined for uses other than pharmaceutical.  Regulating poppy 
cultivation and production of opioids would allow current growers 
and producers to exit the illicit market and to take advantage of an 
already specialized sector.  This could facilitate the construction of a 
legal market (and the displacement of the current illicit one). 
Mexico does not have an opioid use problem like in other 
countries, such as the neighboring United States.  It is however, one 
of the world’s main poppy cultivators.  According to the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Mexico is the third-
largest opium poppy cultivator in the world, after Afghanistan and 
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Myanmar.210  By 2016, Mexican poppy cultivation had purportedly 
grown more than three times the national amount estimated in 
2013.211 
The central objective of drug policy should be to prevent or limit 
the use of opioids for non-medical purposes, while bringing 
cultivators into the legal market.  This can be done through 
regulation.  As shown by the Global Commission on Drug Policy’s 
Position Paper “The Opioid Crisis in North America”,212 the opioid 
epidemic in the U.S. started with poorly regulated medical 
prescription and by allowing overly permissive publicity and 
promotion of opioid medications.  The problem was exacerbated 
when a crackdown on the medical supply was carried out without 
providing adequate treatment and harm reduction measures to 
existing users.  By abruptly cutting off legal supply, users moved 
into the black market to more dangerous illicit street drugs, such as 
heroin, and highly potent synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.  The 
result was an increase in overdoses and mortality.213  To ensure that 
Mexico does not face a similar problem, a two-pronged approach 
should be implemented.  On the one hand, strict controls must be 
placed on the distribution, promotion, and publicity of opioid-
derived medicines.  This should include guidelines and training on 
prescription and regular monitoring of health providers.  
Additionally, public health campaigns should be put in place to 
warn the medical community (doctors, nurses, and hospital staff) 
and patients of the risks of drug use disorder and overdoses that can 
arise from the medical use of opioids.  On the other hand, existing 
users and people who lose access to prescription opioids should be 
 
 210 See UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 
26 (2016), 
https://www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016/WORLD_DRUG_REPORT_2016_web.pd
f [https://perma.cc/BZ3P-JXHA]. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See The Opioid Crisis In North America (Global Commission on Drug Policy, 
Position Paper, Oct. 2017), http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/2017-GCDP-Position-Paper-Opioid-Crisis-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4N9L-49CS].  See also Nick Werle & Ernesto Zedillo, We Can’t 
Go Cold Turkey: Why Suppressing Drug Markets Endangers Society, 46 J. L. MED. & 
ETHICS 325 (2018). 
 213 See Werle & Zedillo, supra note 212 (noting that the U.S. regulation of 
opioids simultaneously suppresses and promotes their use, and the law employs 
harsh criminal and regulatory sanctions to suppress illicit use, while at the same 
time legally supplying opioids through an immensely profitable and powerful 
pharmaceutical industry). 
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offered immediate access to adequate treatment and harm reduction 
measures. 
Although Mexico does not yet have a problem with prescription 
opiate use, it has registered a rise in heroin use.214  For the existing 
heroin-using population, we propose public treatment services that 
should offer a range of options including provision of heroin-
assisted treatment (HAT) in affected communities.  If needed, 
registered dependent users would be able to obtain a strictly 
controlled, quality supply of heroin from doctors or pharmacists.  
People who use heroin would have medical settings in which to use, 
with the possibility of taking small quantities for external use.  This 
ensures the strength and purity of heroin is known and controlled, 
and that it is used with clean injecting equipment.  Pilot programs 
for HAT should be set up in those places that currently have the 
most prevalence, such as Tijuana and other border cities.215 
Additionally, in terms of treatment, opioid substitution therapy 
(OST) should be explored, including the use of medical cannabis as 
a substitute for problematic opioid use.  OSTs—including 
methadone216 and buprenorphine—should be put in place without 
burdensome rules or drug testing requirements.217  While OSTs are 
not a cure, per se, they can help patients stabilize their lives and 
manage their use, and reduce the harmful consequences of 
problematic drug use.  Maintenance therapy has been shown to be 
more clinically effective and cost effective than detoxification.218 
 
 214 See Martínez, supra note 141; Zambrano & Gómez, supra note 141. 
 215 In other countries currently using HAT, availability is limited.  It is only 
available under strict criteria, including long-term use and failure to respond to 
other treatments.  We recommend providing HAT without those barriers to entry. 
 216 Methadone is a synthetic opioid that produces longer-lasting, less intense 
intoxication than heroin, permitting people with opioid dependence to achieve a 
stable, high-functioning state without withdrawal symptoms or cravings.  It has 
been proven to reduce illicit opioid use. 
 217 In countries like the United States, there are extensive federal regulations 
governing methadone maintenance.  Under federal law, all methadone 
maintenance treatments must occur in a federally regulated opioid treatment 
program.  Specially licensed practitioners must provide the treatments, and the law 
prohibits them from prescribing methadone.  Methadone for maintenance generally 
must be dispensed and immediately consumed, requiring patients to visit clinics 
daily.  Finally, opioid treatment programs must randomly screen patients for illicit 
drugs.  Other forms of opioid maintenance are also restricted by law.  Doctors 
seeking to prescribe buprenorphine must receive special training and certifications, 
and federal law limits the number of patients they may treat at any time. 
 218 See Werle & Zedillo, supra note 212. 
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For opiates, we also recommend the following harm reduction 
measures:219 
  Providing safe-injection facilities, which provide people who 
use drugs with a safe, hygienic place to consume drugs 
obtained off-premises; 
  Ensuring patients are not summarily cut off from opioids; 
  Implementing needle and syringe exchange programs, 
including access to clean syringes, other sterile drug 
equipment and education (e.g. teaching sterilization 
techniques); 
  Providing HIV and Hepatitis C testing; 
  Preventing overdose, which should include prescribing 
naloxone with opioids; and 
  Counseling and educating the community. 
Finally, apart from an increase in federal, state, and local budgets 
for prevention, education, and treatment, we recommend that 
public funding go to the Ministry of Health to create more public 
centers for residential treatment, so that people who use drugs are 
not left with poorly regulated, privately run “annexes” as their only 
option.220 
 
3. Cocaine 
 
In contrast to other substances, we offer here only one 
recommendation merely as an illustration of a possible regulation 
model.  As in the other cases, any decision on cocaine regulation 
must be based on sound, multidisciplinary and comprehensive 
studies not yet available.  It is important to note that what little 
experience with regulation of legal coca exists is not applicable to 
Mexico, as Mexico is not currently a producer of coca and has no 
documented traditional use of coca.  For coca and, more 
importantly, cocaine, a state monopoly of cultivation, production, 
importation, and wholesale should be set up, and a limited number 
of pharmacies should be licensed to sell the final product with 
 
 219 These recommended measures also apply to people who use other 
injection drugs, such as meth.  These policies and services should be easy to access, 
involve people who use drugs in the program design, and include those people as 
peers and providers.  Additional providers should be trained in drug user health, 
ensuring that anybody working on harm reduction measures or treatment has the 
proper training and scientific and medical knowledge. 
 220 Like the harm reduction measures, this applies to people who use any drug 
where residential treatment is needed. 
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required doctor prescriptions. These pharmacies should follow strict 
guidelines such as labeling and registering quantities, and not 
publicizing that they sell the drug. Regulating cocaine would serve 
as a harm reduction measure avoiding other, more dangerous, 
forms of coca derivatives, such as crack, while providing access to 
safe products.  It would also be a means to reduce violence and 
trafficking, specifically international trafficking as national 
production would substitute for importation. 
 
4. Others 
 
Methamphetamine and commercial inhalants are two 
substances particularly problematic under current prohibition, yet 
regulated policy solutions are less frequently explored in the 
literature than in the cases of opioids or cannabis.  Consideration 
could be given to a two-pronged approach: decriminalizing 
methamphetamine use and possession for personal use and 
prompting people who use methamphetamine to switch over to 
safer, legal drugs.  Later, the HAT model could potentially be 
adapted for methamphetamine use.  Currently, there are no market-
approved medications used to treat meth dependence; however, 
some studies show that using prescription stimulants could treat 
both methamphetamine and cocaine dependence.221 Research 
should be funded to further investigate this alternative. 
As to inhalants (a commercial product not currently under 
prohibition yet very harmful when used as a drug), pilot programs 
could be explored, such as a program to substitute an inhalant with 
legal cannabis.  Revenue from the emergent licit markets in 
cannabis, opioids, and cocaine should be partially earmarked to 
provide prevention and treatment for populations who use 
inhalants, particularly youth. 
Enforcement of drug laws: quickly deescalating militarization 
The enforcement of drug laws should be primarily an 
administrative matter, not a criminal one.  The military should not 
 
 221 See John Mariani & Frances Levin, Psychostimulant Treatment of Cocaine 
Dependence, 35(2) PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA (June 2012) 425; Alison 
Knopf, AMAT for methamphetamine or cocaine addiction: The case for Rx -stimulants, 
27(36) ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE WEEKLY (Sept. 21, 2015). 
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participate in drug control efforts or any other criminal or public 
security matters, in accordance with Article 21 of Mexico’s 
Constitution.  Current militarization must be deescalated in a 
programmed manner, which takes into consideration the 
differentiated security needs of regions and cities and sets out time-
frames needed to professionalize civil authorities that would 
substitute the military forces currently tasked with public security 
duties.  While the military continues to perform tasks 
constitutionally reserved to civil authorities, it should be regulated 
by a transitory and exceptional public security framework, which 
would include guidelines for the use of weapons and protocols as 
regards their presence and operations among the civilian 
population. The currently used framework designed for military 
conflict, to which the military’s training and tactics logically 
correspond, should not be used. 
It is also indispensable that government gather, produce, and 
publish information about the use of force by public authorities.  
Investigations should be carried out to determine responsibility in 
the systematic rise of violence and torture, with civilian supervision 
to ensure transparency.  Importantly, every recorded case in which 
authorities have used lethal force should be fully investigated by 
civil—as opposed to military—authorities. 
Other considerations 
Given the importance of the right to health—and the obligation 
of the government to respect, protect, promote, and guarantee it— 
any drug policy reform should have the health system—both public 
and private—as a key player.  The public health system, including 
the Ministry of Health and the social security institutes for private 
and state workers (IMSS and ISSSTE national and state’s), should 
decisively and directly participate in education, prevention and 
treatment efforts, alongside the more traditional drug policy offices, 
such as the National Commission Against Addictions (CONADIC).  
Drug policy and the right to health in relation to drug policy are not 
simply about drug use, but also about health and wellbeing in a 
broader sense.  Additionally, because drug policy in Mexico is tied 
to many other arenas, including opportunities for employment and 
education, the health sector should lead the inter-sectorial work, 
with the education, agriculture, and labor sectors, to guarantee the 
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right to health.  The private health system should follow any new 
recommendations for drug treatment as well. 
In order for the government to guarantee the right to health, it 
needs to improve efforts geared toward treatment, prevention, and 
education.  For this to take place, it is crucial to increase the federal 
and state budgets, to allocate more resources. 
 
Education and prevention: 
 
  Education and prevention should be at the center of drug 
policy.  This includes providing information about risks and 
adopting policies to manage risk.  For example, the quality 
of products must be supervised, advertisement of drugs 
should be tightly restricted or even banned, and sales to 
minors should be punished. 
  The public needs to see drug use as a public health issue, not 
a criminal one.  The government should promote a 
destigmatizing campaign so that people who use drugs are 
not criminalized or shunned. 
  Any strategy of prevention and education must start from 
childhood to prevent the use of drugs by children.  A broad 
set of prevention measures need to be adopted specifically 
for minors, including but not limited to services aimed at 
preventing use by minors in general and early detection 
programs to identify populations already engaged in 
experimental or occasional use in order to help them avoid 
excessive, frequent or problematic use. 
  Respecting the framework of human rights and, specifically, 
the right to the free development of personality, an 
ambitious campaign of objective and truthful information 
about marijuana and its risks should be put in place so that 
adults can make their personal choices. 
  Actions tailored to vulnerable groups, including children, 
adolescents, people suffering from mental illness, and 
problematic or dependent users should be designed and 
implemented. 
 
Treatment: 
 
  The State has the obligation to offer prevention and 
rehabilitation services.  Any model that is used to comply 
with this obligation must be based on the reduction of risks 
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and damages, understanding this concept as a set of policies 
and non-coercive incremental programs aimed at avoiding 
or reducing risk situations with a clear view to reduce the 
associated damages.  It must also guarantee that all the 
institutions and people in charge of working in the 
prevention and treatment of the problematic use of 
substances are trained and sensitized with the most up-to-
date information. 
  These services should be voluntary, free, secular, and 
universally accessible based on health and human rights. 
  It is crucial to provide resources to the Ministry of Health to 
enable it to offer in-patient rehabilitation at public centers.  
So that the so-called annexes will not be the only cost-
effective solution, the State needs to provide rehabilitation 
centers where patients can stay long-term and receive 
appropriate medical treatment.  Budgets also need to be 
increased so that monitoring and inspection of all existing 
centers and annexes can take place. 
  There must be rehabilitation centers specifically tailored for 
women. 
 
Information: 
 
  Strengthen data collecting capabilities on the use of 
marijuana in particular, and all other drugs in general. 
  Strengthen data collecting capabilities regarding black 
markets of drugs. 
  Procure information on the changes in drug policy so that 
variables can be identified and measured over time. This will 
ensure an accurate evaluation of the success or failure of the 
policy. 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The “war on drugs” has failed globally and has led to a national 
tragedy in Mexico.  The attempt to enforce prohibition has brought 
about crime, violence, death, disease, corruption, undermining of 
institutions and violation of essential human rights.  Indeed, 
Mexico’s extremely weak rule of law is a big problem of which the 
explosion of organized crime is one of its many expressions. 
Strengthening the rule of law is possible by undertaking a 
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comprehensive and intelligently conceived overhaul of the justice 
and security institutions according to internationally established 
and tested standards.  But addressing the severe ills stemming from 
the illegal trafficking of drugs requires the total abandonment of the 
paradigm of prohibition that has guided drug policies for too long 
in Mexico and practically everywhere else in the world.  Human 
rights and public health must be the two essential pillars of the new 
paradigm. Prohibition must be discarded and replaced by 
regulation.  We have sought, in this paper, to give many reasons for 
why a radical transformation of drug policy in Mexico is not only 
justified but indispensable.  We have also outlined possible avenues 
for pursuing reform.  It is crucial that this transformation be 
undertaken as soon as possible. 
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